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iAbstract
In this work, the determinants of public expenditure on education are investigated for
the 27 European Union countries. After having derived a demand model of the public
expenditure structure from an extended version of the median voter model, I estimate
the demand equations system on data from the COFOG-Eurostat dataset. The empirical
results suggest that public expenditure on education is found to be influenced not only
by economic determinants (relative prices), but also by institutional factors.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The renewed version of the Stability and Growth Pact guarantees several elements of
flexibility in the expenditure policies that the European Union countries may decide
to adopt, even though the financial constraints on public debt and deficit still keep to
hold following article 126 of “The Treaty of the functioning of the European Union”.
In particular, Member States shall avoid excessive government deficits. A wider
room for manoeuvre was allowed in order to encourage economic growth, also through
a rationalization of public expenditure. Indeed, some new factors as the long-term sus-
tainability of public finance are come to be taken into consideration for the compatibility
and consistency of countries policies with the Treaty itself. This change was intended
to encourage members countries to adjust their policies towards a more sustainable di-
rection, in order to reinforce the financial stability of some expenditure functions such
as the social security, and to stimulate the rate of potential growth of the economy.
In this context, it will be increasingly important to find a country-specific strategy to
change the composition of public expenditure by function for welfare, rather than its
global size. Indeed, issues as the relationship between social security and assistance,
between direct expenditure on the provision of services and expenditure for transfers,
between investment expenditure in human capital and current expenditure strictu sensu,
are already within the frame of reference for the verification of the Treaty constraints.
Structural reforms that will affect the deficit in the short term, but that will increase the
long-term sustainability also stimulating economic growth (at least from the perspective
of the Lisbon objectives) could be allowed in this context.
1
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Several models of government expenditure and economic growth (among the others Barro
[1990] and Devarajan et al. [1996]) have indeed pointed out that the functional com-
position of government expenditure is a decisive factor for growth. In particular, these
authors showed that there exists a specific distribution of spending which maximizes
growth. Hence, countries with a similar expenditure composition would tend towards
similar growth rates.
For this reason, in this work I analyse the allocation of public resources across the
different categories. In particular, this work aims to focus on public expenditure on
education in the European Union. Indeed, among the public expenditure categories,
education plays a prominent role both in terms of total resources dedicated and influence
on the future and the attitudes of the new generations.
One possible approach is to look for the long-run relationship between expenditure on
education and the income growth rate. However, this approach would consider public
investment decisions towards a single expenditure category as completely independent
from two natural and necessary constraints. The first is the amount of total available
resources for the government. The second, which is closely interconnected with the
first, is the fact that, given the total available resources, the different expenditure cate-
gories may be attributed different weights by different governments in different periods,
although weights must always sum to one.
In other words, it is necessary to consider the trade-off which is essentially present in the
policy-makers‘ decisions among the various categories of spending: in the short term, an
increase in public expenditure on education implies the decrease of public expenditure on
at least one other category by the same amount. Following this path, the policy-maker’s
preferences are revealed by the resource allocations decisions among the expenditure
categories.
Even though the focus of the analysis will be kept on public expenditure on education,
it is clear that the analysis of the results has to take into account the marginal rate of
substitution between the different types of public good with respect to the education
one in terms of the citizens’ utility function.
From a theoretical point of view, I will adopt a revised and extended version of the
median voter model, one of the most widespread models in the economic literature for
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the analysis and evaluation of the factors that determine the composition of government
spending by category. From this theoretical model, I will estimate a simultaneous equa-
tion econometric model in order to assess the elasticity of each of the variables identified
in the theoretical model with respect to the share of public expenditure in each sector.
Specifically, my analysis will focus on the 27 EU countries between 1995 and 2011, and
will be based on the data contained in the free access COFOG database produced by
Eurostat.
The main conclusions of this work may have both a descriptive and a normative inter-
est. Concerning the former, it would be possible to identify, and quantify through an
econometric estimation, the relationships among the theoretical determinants and the
public expenditure by function. This result would provide an insight of the endogenous
and exogenous factors that influence per se public expenditure by function. With regard
to the second aspect, given that a maximizing growth public expenditure composition
exists, the governments could manage to influence the determinants which would be
used as policy leverages to change the composition of public expenditure, provided that
all of the determinants can be directly and uniquely modified from policy-makers.
In order to investigate these several aspects, this work will be organised as follows. In
Chapter 2, I provide an extended review of the theoretical and empirical evidence con-
cerning the determinants of public expenditure on education, with a particular focus on
the European countries.
In Chapter 3, I analyse the main sources and the structure of the dataset used to im-
plement the empirical analysis. I will also give a short description of the main variables
used in the econometric model. In particular, I describe them from an historical and
geographical point of view. The aim of the chapter is to provide and understanding
of the structure of the data and the general historical evolution of the main variables,
before any econometric analysis is implemented.
In Chapter 4, I provide an extended and revised version of the median voter theoretical
model, which is the basic tool for the empirical analysis.
In Chapter 5, descending from the previous parts, the econometric model for the simul-
taneous equation analysis of the determinants of each public expenditure category is
presented. Moreover, I discuss the results of the empirical analysis, focusing the atten-
tion on the determinants of public expenditure on education.
Finally, in Chapter 6 I draw the most significant conclusions of this work.
Chapter 2
Literature review
In this section I aim to illustrate the main theoretical and empirical results in the
economic literature, concerning the analysis of the determinants of public expenditure on
education. To this extent, I will follow a two-step approach. First, I will show that there
exists a substantial agreement on the issue that the (private or public) expenditure on
education is one of the determinants of modern economic growth. Second, I will focus the
analysis on the research of the determinants of public expenditure on education per se.
In particular, the analysis will be twofold: on the one side, I will consider the economic
modelling of public education; on the other side, I will present the main econometric and
empirical results in the same field of research. The main aim of this review is to identify
the variables which have been found relevant in the determination of the public spending
on education, which both a theoretical and an econometric approach. This analysis will
allow me to circumscribe my following statistical and econometric investigation on a
consolidated set of plausible and widely accepted variables.
2.1 Theoretical results
From a theoretical perspective, the existence of positive externalities associated to ed-
ucation - concerning, for instance, technological progress, reduction of the number of
crimes, larger enforceability of the rule of law - justifies the idea that the social return
of education is larger than its private return.
The private return on education is the rate which equalizes the present value of future
4
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revenues, defined by the income differential due to a larger amount of years of education,
and the present value of the investment costs in education, given by the sum of direct
costs (e.g. textbooks or fees) and the opportunity cost of not working during the studies.
As a matter of fact, unlike the social returns, private returns in education do not take
into consideration some positive externalities, from the revenues’ side, and some nega-
tive spillovers, from the public costs’ side. If the level of the externalities is sufficiently
high, the social return of education could result larger than its private return.
This possibility is considered within several endogenous growth models. In these models,
education is considered as a possible determinant of economic growth. The role of
education and human capital in economic growth has been analysed according to two
different interpretations (Krueger and Lindahl [2000]): growth could be influenced by the
accumulation over time of human capital (as in Lucas [1988]) or by its level of existing
stock in a certain moment (as in Romer [1990] through the technological innovation tool
or as in Nelson and Phelps [1966] through imitation process).
According to the first approach, in a population of infinitely-lived agents, each individ-
ual decides at any time how to allocate his/her time between current production and
accumulation of knowledge, which in turn increases the future productivity of the eco-
nomic system. The main results of Lucas’ model are summarized in the following two
equations:
y = kβ(uh)1−β, (2.1)
h˙ = δh(1− u), δ > 0, (2.2)
where h is the stock of human capital of the agent, k is the stock of capital, y is
income, u is the share of his/her time allocated to the production and β ∈ (0, 1).
Equation (2.1) describes how human capital and physical capital jointly determine the
current production y. The stock of physical capital grows according the usual Solovian
differential equation applied to the representative agent k˙ = y - c, where c is the current
consumption.
The equation (2.2) describes how (1-u), the time employed for education, affects the
accumulation of human capital. However, since the accumulation of human capital
is associated to positive externalities for the entire community, public intervention is
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justified and (2.1) could be modified as follows:
y = kβ(uh)1−β(hq)γ , (2.3)
where hq = (1/n)
∑n
i=1 hi represents the stock of average human capital in the economy.
Since γ > 0, the equilibrium growth could be sub-optimal. This implies that the agents
may not be able to completely internalize the effects of the positive spillovers of the hu-
man capital: when they make their time allocation decision between present production
and education, they could invest less in this latter activity. Hence, in order to correct
this failure, public intervention may occur. In the Lucas model, the assumption that the
accumulation of human capital implies constant return to scale determines a positive
growth rate in steady state equal to
g = δ(1− u∗), (2.4)
where (1 − u∗) is the optimal allocation of time allocated to education. Aghion and
Howitt [1998] showed that this variable negatively depends on the intertemporal prefer-
ence rate and on the risk aversion coefficient, and it is positively related to the produc-
tivity of services and education, measured by the efficiency in organizing the education
system. Accordingly, if the public intervention increases the time allocated to education,
it indirectly determines a positive effect on economic growth through the (2.1), (2.2) and
(2.4). Furthermore, the allocation of time to education also depends on the efficiency
of capital markets. In fact, the banking system is usually unwilling to offer private
funds for this kind of risky and deferred investments. Hence, public student loans could
constitute a stimulus for economic growth.
In fact, the credit rationing plays an even deeper role in the determination of public
expenditure on education. Indeed, Galor and Zeira [1993] show that in presence of credit
market’s imperfections the initial distribution of wealth affects the aggregate output
both in the short and the long-run. Then, if consumers do not have enough resources to
finance their own education and they do not have access to credit, in principle they are
not able to invest in their human capital and, consequently, to improve their income.
Through this result, it is possible to conclude that in the presence of imperfect credit
markets, education should be funded through public expenditure, in order to stimulate
economic growth through the accumulation of human capital.
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With regard to the second approach, Romer’s growth model [1990] is considered. In this
framework, the production function has the following form
y = hαy l
β
∫ A
0
x(i)1−α−βdi, (2.5)
where hy is the human capital used in the different R&D sectors, l is labour input and
x(i) indicate the different types of physical capital which depend on the technology level
A. Specifically, the dynamics of technology progress follows the equation
dlog(A)
dt
= chA (2.6)
where hA is the human capital used in the R&D sector. Accordingly, when hA increases,
the technological progress and the production of physical capital increase, with positive
effects on the growth of the present production.
Concerning the issue of the quality of the education system, Glewwe [2002] extends
the model a` la Lucas, supposing an intergenerational relationship between parents and
children. In this context, the investment in education is chosen by parents for their
child and depends on the quality of the education system, the learning abilities of the
child, the preference for more educated sons, the weight assigned to the parents future
consumption and, ultimately, the individual cost of education, which can be affected
by public intervention. According to this analysis, the quality of education and the
number of years to be devoted to education are alternative inputs in the production
of knowledge. Nevertheless, both variables increase the greater the preference for more
educated children and the higher the weight assigned to their future consumption are.
This result depends on the assumption that investment in children’s education is a
strategy that parents may adopt in order to transfer income from the present to the
future, under the hypothesis that children will transfer part of their income to their
parent.
In this regard, a relevant strand of literature has studied the combination between
(public and private) spending on education and social security systems, with a particular
attention devoted to pension systems. In this context, investment in education and
human capital accumulation may show more articulated effects on the economic growth.
In fact, both these public expenditure items are considered as intergenerational transfer
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mechanisms financed by taxes on labour income. Certainly, these altruistic transfers
may show a significant effect on the growth process for the impact they have on the
accumulation of physical and human capital.
For instance, Kaganovich and Zilcha [1999] develop an overlapping generations model in
which the members of each generation are identical and offer a unit of work during the
first period, adjusted by an efficiency parameter due to human capital. The government
provides education to young people and pensions to the elderly, financing both activities
with a proportional tax on labour income. In this model, the human capital of each
individual is a function of the private investment in education made by parents, of the
human capital of the parents and of the public investment in education made by the
government. In particular, the investment in education of parents and the government
are complementary: parents may finance the pre-school activities and the university
studies, while the government may have a more important role in financing primary
and secondary education. Moreover, individual preferences show a form of one-way
altruism of parents towards their children. When the parents retire, their children‘s
labor income is taxed to finance the pensions. Kaganovich and Zilcha show that altruistic
decisions tend to generate inefficient intertemporal competitive equilibria. On the one
hand, the investment in their children’s education ignores the positive effect that the
distribution of human capital towards the aggregate production process has. On the
other hand, social security may increase wealth, but it may also have a perverse effect
on production through the contraction of private savings which could not be adequately
compensated by the public sector. The crucial issue is that, while the link between the
children’s human capital and the benefits of the pensions for the parents is not caught
by the parents’ investment decisions, it is captured by the government’s intertemporal
optimization process.
Therefore, the main result of this contribution is that a public system of social security
is able to support growth if it is associated with a preference structure that shows
a significant interest for the income of the retirement period, together with a strong
altruistic inclination to their children. Under these conditions, the social security system
can combine the parents future benefits with the aggregate effect of human capital
on growth, allowing parents to reallocate more income to their children’s education.
Adopting a model of the development of human capital which is even more influenced
by the original Lucas’, Kemnitz and Wigger [2000] obtain a similar result.
Chapter 2. Literature review 9
In conclusion, the main contribution connected with this strand of the literature - rep-
resented by different endogenous growth models which address the issue of education -
is to show that the effect of social security on the economic growth is not necessarily
negative when the effects of savings (and physical capital) contraction are associated
with increases in human capital.
2.2 Empirical results
The empirical literature has analysed the economic effects of education both from a mi-
cro and a macroeconomic perspective. The first category of analysis generally comes to
the conclusion that the higher is the level of education, the higher is the level of income.
On the contrary, there is not a consensus among scholars about the positive effect of
education on growth. In particular, several authors have tried first to verify whether the
economic growth is influenced by education and, if that is the case, whether it depends
on the level of education of the specific country (usually measured by the literacy rate),
rather than on the increase of education over a certain period of time (for instance,
the growth of the literacy rate over two different years). Yet, it is appropriate to issue
certain caveats on both types of empirical analysis.
First, the implementation of policy in favour of education is usually concurrent with
other public policies which could have a positive impact on growth. For this reason, it
could be difficult to isolate the contribution of education itself [Krueger and Lindahl,
2000].
Second, the positive influence of education on growth depends on the institutional fea-
tures of the analysed country, which could depend in turn on the quality of the education
system [Checchi, 1999]. Since a positive relation between the quality of the education
system and the results in education has been found [Behrman and Birdsall, 1984], the
comparison among countries performances could be biased. Consequently, from a prac-
tical perspective, it may be arduous to identify the best variable to define the human
capital and several indicators have been used (e.g. number of years of education, pub-
lic expenditure in education, completion rates), also depending on the availability of
data. The choice of the variable may be crucial for the empirical results. In fact, using
three different plausible proxies of education, Checchi [1999] found that the literacy rate,
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the completion rate and the diffusion of newspapers among different countries are not
strongly correlated.
Concerning the empirical validation of the main theoretical models which were described
in the theoretical section, the results are mixed. Mankiw, Romer and Weil [1992] show
that an augmented Solow model, including the accumulation of both physical and hu-
man capital, provides a good description of cross-country data. Moreover, their empiri-
cal analysis confirm that, holding population growth and capital accumulation constant,
countries show a growth rate which is consistent with the one theoretically predicted
by the augmented version of the Solow model. Benhabib and Spiegel [1994] conclude
that the human capital does not contribute to the economic growth as a separate input
and, consequently, the accumulation of human capital does not show a relevant impact
on growth. On the contrary, the stock of human capital allows the countries with a
more educated population to more rapidly adopt new technologies from abroad and to
develop new local ones. This result confirms the theoretical models of Nelson and Phelps
[1966] and Romer [1990]. However, more recently, several empirical studies have shown
that economic growth is not influenced only by the stock of human capital, but also
by its accumulation. Interestingly, Temple [1999] arrives to this result using the same
dataset analysed by Benhabib and Spiegel, but not considering some outliers countries.
A similar result is obtained by Topel [1999] after having taken into consideration the
effects of possible measurement mistakes of education. On a similar direction, Glaeser
and colleagues [2004] have shown that economic growth is more influenced by the accu-
mulation of capital rather than by enhancements in political institutions of a country.
In fact, according to their approach, during the first phase of development of a country
the accumulation of human capital stimulates growth provided that property rights are
guaranteed, even though non-democratic institutions operate. During the second phase,
the increase of education and wealth generates a democratization process of political
institutions.
Beyond the specific empirical results, several scholars are cautious when conducting
international comparisons in the field of education. Krueger and Lindahl [2000], for
example, argue that education can be considered as an exogenous variable in analysing
the relationship between education and income within the country, this could not be
taken for granted at the international level. According to these authors, the effect of
the level of education on growth is not linear: a positive relation between education
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and growth is found in countries with low levels of education, while this relation does
not exist or is the opposite in countries with medium and high levels education. Hence,
such a relation assumes the shape of an inverted U, where the average OECD country
lies on the descending part of the curve. If we accept this hypothesis, it would not
be possible to exclude the existence of a reverse causal relation between education and
growth, according to which economic growth would cause higher education [Bils and
Klenow, 2000]. As a result, only when a certain threshold is exceeded, education would
generate positive externalities in line with the view taken by Barro [1991]. According
to this interpretation, late-comers countries which have at their disposal a large human
capital endowment would have the possibility to rapidly obtain the most advanced levels
of economic development.
2.3 The determinants of public expenditure
So far, I have described from a theoretical and empirical perspective the analysis con-
ducted in the economic literature concerning the relationship between (public expendi-
ture on) education and economic growth. The main resulting issue is that a positive
relationship between these two variables exists.
Given this relevant result, it is now useful to focus the attention on the wide literature
debate concerning the determinants of the composition of public expenditure, with a
particular attention on the expenditure on education. In fact, the public sector may
affect the economic well-being of individuals and of an entire society through different
factors. A first version of the classification of Government expenditure by functions
which is commonly address to implement a determinant analysis is the COFOG classi-
fication (a detailed table is in Appendix A), which was defined by the United Nations
Statistics Division and has been widely introduced by scholars in several analysis related
to Government expenditure and growth. More precisely, the original version of COFOG,
which is composed of eleven categories, has been selectively applied by different scholar.
For instance, Oxley and Martin [1991] and Saunders [1993] prefer a more synthetic ver-
sion of the classification, in which a broader definition of functions is provided. In fact,
general administrative services, public order and safety, and defence are collected in the
category of pure goods; health, education and housing in the category of merit goods;
transports and communications, other economic services, and recreational, cultural and
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religious affairs are collected in the category of economic services and other ; social wel-
fare corresponds to transfers. Analogously, Bleaney and colleagues [1999] collect the
pure and the merit goods (with the addition of transports) in the category of productive
goods and the categories of economic services and transfers in the one of non-productive
goods.
More recently, Sanz and Velazquez [2002] have proposed a classification with eight func-
tions, which is similar to the COFOG but still more concise for the non-productive goods.
Following this version of the classification, in this review I conduct the determinant anal-
ysis on the following possible factors: income, relative prices of public goods, population
level, population density, population structure by age, institutional factors and income
inequality.
The variable income generally shows a positive correlation with the different components
of public expenditure. For instance, this is the case for defense, public order and security
[Murdock and Sandler, 1984, Pradhan and Ravaillon, 1998; Sezgin, 2000] and for merit
goods. Concerning the latter case, several studies show elasticities larger than 1, so
that the goods produced by these industries are usually identified as luxury goods. This
is reflected in Leu [1986], Newhouse [1987], Gerdtham and colleagues [1992] and Sanz
and Velazquez [2002], for what that concern the health sector. The same issue is found
for the housing sector by Snyder and Yackovlev [2000], although Sanz and Velazquez
[2002] ascertain a negative elasticity in the same sector. As for spending on education,
Falch and Rattso [1997], for Norway between 1880 and 1990, and Cheung and Chan
[2008], who underline the role of the government in empowering the culture of education
especially in developing countries, obtain similar results.
However, according to several scholars this result could be a mere statistical artifact
caused by the omission of some variables from the model, by the possible presence
of spurious regressions or by the absence or paucity of data at the disaggregate level.
This hypothesis is supported by the contributions of McGuire and colleagues [1993],
Gerdtham and colleagues [1994] and Di Matteo and Di Matteo [1998], as regards the
health sector and of Fernandez and Rogerson [1997], with regard to education. On the
contrary, other scholars obtain a positive elasticity between income and spending on
education, but still smaller than 1 and not statistically significant [Borge and Rattso,
1995; Fernandez and Rogerson, 1997; Sanz and Velazquez, 2002; Di Matteo, 2005].
With regard to the demographic structure of the population, an analysis of the different
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functions of public expenditure dismantled by age groups provides relevant results. In
fact, the proportional increase of certain segments of the population may generate higher
spending on some specific public functions. For instance, a proportional increase of
the number of elderly (>64 years old) or young people (between 18 and 25 years old)
over the total population generates higher spending on health [Murthy and Ukpolo,
1994, Di Matteo and Di Matteo, 1998; Hitiris, 1999], in housing [Curie and Yelowitz,
1997] and social security [Heller et al. 1986; Hagemann and Nicoletti, 1989]. However,
Sanz and Velazquez [2002] have not found a significant elasticity for both the variables.
Furthermore, an increase of the young over the total population may generate an increase
in spending on education [Marlow and Shiers, 1999; Ahlin and Johansson, 2001]. In
addition, local public expenditure on education is positively associated with the issuance
of grants in-aid from higher-level Governments [Fisher and Navin, 1992]. However,
several scholars have not found a similar statistically significant relationship [Poterba,
1997; Fernandez and Rogerson, 1997; Painter and Bae, 2001; Sanz and Velazquez, 2002;
Gebremariam et al., 2008]. These scholars have instead found a significant negative
relation between education and the share of the population over 64 years old [Falch and
Rattso, 1997].
In several works, the population size and its density are statistically related with the
various functions of public spending. Specifically, this result is particularly evident in
the case of the relationship with the expenditure in defense [Murdoch and Sadler, 1990]
and in transports [Randalph et al., 1996] which are both negatively correlated to the
population size and its density. With regard to the expenditure in health, the results
are mixed. In fact, while Gerdtham and colleagues [1992] and Fay [2000] ascertain again
negative elasticities, Chawla and colleagues [1998] and Sanz and Velazquez [2002], do
not find a statistically significant effect between population density and health spending.
As regards the merit goods, even for the expenditure on education results are not unam-
biguous. In fact, while some scholars find negative elasticities [Fernandez and Rogerson,
1997; Falch and Rattso, 1999], Gebremariam et al. [2012] ascertain an inelastic coeffi-
cient of the relation between education an population density, and Marlow and Shiers
[1999] even find a positive coefficient. Similarly, Gemmell and colleagues [2008] observe
a positive elasticity of education and the level of the population. Thus, the evidence of
a negative coefficient, although mixed, indicates the advantage of scale in the provision
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these public services. On the other hand Curie and Yelowitz [2000] and Sanz and Ve-
lazquez [2002], show that a higher population density leads to a greater public sector
expenditure on housing.
The public sector competes with the private sector in the production of several goods in
different markets. The competition may affect changes in public spending in different
sectors, since the public sector needs to produce more efficiently, for example by reducing
the cost of wages, in order to compete with the private sector. However, since public
wages are very sticky the productivity of the public sector grow less than inflation,
generating a higher expenditure in nominal terms [Baumol, 1967; Mueller, 1989]. Despite
the importance of the phenomenon, several models that estimate the elasticity of the
determinants of the public expenditures functions, do not introduce a variable for relative
prices. However, other scholars introduce proxy variables. For instance, Gerdtham
and colleagues [1992] use the ratio between Purchasing Power Standard for health and
GDP, while Sanz and Velazquez [2002] use the deflators of the public-private sectors.
The empirical results show a general inelasticity of relative prices for several sectors,
including health [Gerdtham et al., 1992; Sanz and Velazquez, 2002], and education
[Falch and Rattso, 1997; Ahlin and Johansson, 2001; Sanz and Velazquez , 2002], with
the exception of the defense sector [Okamura, 1991].
The degree of decentralization of public decisions and the size of public spending of the
government or of its local branches have an impact on the different components of public
expenditure. In fact, they represent the institutional factors that are widely analyzed in
literature. Specifically, especially in the areas of merit goods and in the economic services
sector, statistically significant elasticites are found [Heshmati, 2001, in the health sector;
Falch and Rattso, 1999 and Marlow and Shiers, 1999, in the education sector]. However,
from the different political systems perspective adopted among countries, no statistically
significant results are obtained [Di Matteo, 2000; Snyder and Yackolev, 2000].
The consideration of income inequality as a possible determinant of some functions
of public spending is less consolidated in the economic literature than the previous
variables. In fact, several scholars have analyzed the relationship between inequality
and education, with respect to the effect of different education systems on inequality.
Nevertheless, recently some scholars have found empirically that inequality has an impact
on public expenditure. In fact, as regards the relation between inequality and spending
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on general public services, Dunn and colleagues [2005] ascertain a negative and significant
correlation. This relation is particularly evident in the case of merit goods. Specifically,
with regard to spending in the education sector, Dunn and colleagues [2005] identify
negative and statistically significant elasticity between GINI index and spending time in
second level education, although they have not found a significant relationship between
inequality and public spending on education compulsory basic. The former result is
confirmed, for each level of education, by Fernandez and Rogerson [1995], who show
that under certain conditions, poorer households, whose children are excluded from the
education system, pay their taxes, in this way contributing to finance the education of
those who attend school. However, according to Tanaka [2003] the poor may not support
public education at any condition. In fact, they loose a signicant part of their income if
they do not send their children to work and the taxes on education reduce their current
consumption. Hence, high inequality leads to exit from public education at both ends
of the income distribution [Gutierrez and Tanaka, 2009]. Thus high inequality reduces
the support for public education, leading to a low tax rate and expenditure per student.
Chapter 3
The data
This chapter is dedicated to the descriptive analysis of the data on public expenditure
for the 27 European Union countries for the period 1995-2011. After having given
a description of the dataset and its structure, a cross-section analysis of the data is
conducted in order to provide an overview of the current state (2011) of the composition
of the European public expenditure. Moreover, I analyse the evolution of the allocation
of public expenditure in the past two decades among all the functions. In the last section,
I provide a first descriptive scatter-plot correlation analysis between the expenditure in
each function and the determinants identified in the previous chapter.
3.1 The COFOG classification
The data on public expenditure of the European countries I present are extracted from
the EUROSTAT dataset, organized according to the COFOG international classifica-
tion. This is an acronym for Classification Of Function Of Government, coined for the
first time in the System of National Account (1993) by the European Community, the
International Monetary Fund, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment, the United Nations and the World Bank.
COFOG is structured according to three levels of analysis: ten divisions (or functions
of first level) further articulated in groups (second level functions), and, subsequently,
in classes (functions of third level). The divisions are the primary aims pursued by the
16
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government, groups are related to the specific intervention areas of public policies and
classes identify specific objectives within the areas of intervention.
In this section I present the analysis of data with a special focus on the first level of the
classification. The issue of a more detailed functional classification of public spending
has been widely examined by the European institutions. In fact, since 2003, for the
implementation of the strategies outlined by the European Council through the so-called
Lisbon Strategy, an increasing attention has been dedicated to the study of the quality
of public finance within the European Monetary and Economic Union. In particular, the
Economic Policy Committee (EPC) of the European Commission through the creation
of a specific working group on the quality of public expenditure has expressed the need to
have more detailed analysis of this issue. For this purpose, Eurostat formed a Task Force
with the participation of all the European countries, with the aim to further explore these
issues and to allow the European countries to produce detailed, comparable and reliable
statistics of the second level of public spending according to the COFOG classification.
However, the voluntary nature of the transmission of data at European level does not
allow scholars to conduct detailed international comparison analysis.
Traditionally these ten functions are categorised into four different types of expenditure,
according to the general social and economic function they explain.
First, the “traditional” collective functions - “general public services”, “defence” and
“public order and safety” - are all considered as the main government priorities and
prerogatives. Second, the expenditure on “economic affairs”, which covers support pro-
grammes and public spending in manufacturing, agricultural, construction and trans-
ports, is itself a separate group because of its social and economic relevance and the
heterogeneity of its components. Third, expenditure dedicated to “recreation, culture
and religion” and “education” are usually aggregated, given the functional proximity of
these categories of expenditure. Fourth, “environmental protection” and “housing and
community amenities” are collected, since they both explain the expenditure for the
integrated protection and development of the relations between citizens and the natu-
ral and artificial environment, in both urban and rural contexts. Finally, “health” and
“social protection” constitute two separate categories: it would be difficult to collect
them with other different functions and, due to their relevance in social welfare, these
categories themselves account for a significant part of public expenditure.
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3.2 The function descriptive analysis
This first section consists in a cross-section analysis of the available data on public
expenditure, decomposed following the COFOG ten-function definition. In particular,
this analysis is performed for the most recent available data (2011), in order to provide a
wide overview of the current state of public expenditure among the 27 European Union
countries.
3.2.1 “Traditional” Collective Expenditure
Overall, among countries, expenditure on the “traditional” collective functions is rel-
atively homogeneous within the European Union. Most of the countries had figures
between 15% and 20% of the total expenditure. Only Luxembourg and Estonia at the
lower end (15% of total expenditure) and Greece and Cyprus at the top end (33.4% and
32.6% of total expenditure, respectively) deviate from this band, which contains also
the value for EU-27, equal to the 20.8% of total expenditure. In particular, Luxem-
bourg’s public expenditure is undersized compared to the average in all three functions,
while Estonia’s traditional expenditure is low especially due to low spending in “Gen-
eral Public Services”. Conversely, the performance of Greece and Cyprus is explained
by the fact that both countries spend far more than the average in the “General Public
Services” function (respectively 24.7% and 24% of total expenditure compared to 13.9%
of EU-27).
3.2.1.1 General Public Services
The division “general public services” includes expenses related to executive and leg-
islative organs, financial and fiscal affairs, external affairs, foreign economic aid, general
services, basic research and expenses and transfers related to debt. The expenditure in
this function is the third most relevant in 2011 and amounts to 13.9% of EU-27 total
expenditure. Although this is an important item of the state budget and it represents a
large share of the national GDP, by its nature this function, and in particular some of its
sub-items, is subject to considerable variation across the years. This is particularly clear
in the case of electoral competitions and may represent a significant cost for a country,
especially when political crises at all levels of government become frequent.
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TAB 3.1 Public expenditure on general public services as a percentage of
total expenditure in the EU-27 countries, 2011
Source: Eurostat
In 2011, the countries which have dedicated the larger amount of their total expenditure
to the General Public Services are Greece (24.7%) and Cyprus (24%). This is justifiable
by the fact that political elections were held in both the countries during 2011. Sweden
is above the EU-27 average (14.5%, together with Italy (17.2%), Hungary (17.5%),
Portugal (17%), Malta (15.7%), Slovakia (15.4 %) and Belgium (15%). All the other
countries have spent less than the European average. In particular, Estonia shows the
lowest relative spending on General Public Services (less than 8.4%).
3.2.1.2 Defence
With the function defence, the COFOG collects all the areas of public expenditure
linked with the civil and military protection of the population from foreign threats. This
function includes military and civil defence and the foreign military aid. The spending
on defence represents the 2.8% of the EU-27 total expenditure. The operating costs
are the main part of expenditure in defence (90% of total). In fact, military weapons
are generally treated as intermediate consumption in the current system of national
accounts.
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TAB 3.2 Public expenditure on defence as a percentage of total expenditure
in the EU-27 countries, 2011
Source: Eurostat
The variability of the expenditure in defence among the in European countries is rela-
tively low. In fact, almost all the EU-27 countries reserve between 2 and 3% of their
total expenditure to defence, with the highest concentration around 2,5%. Only Esto-
nia, Greece, Cyprus and the UK spend slightly more (respectively, 4.2%, 4.6%, 4.3%
and 5.1%). On the other hand, Ireland and Luxembourg have reduced their military
spending up to a value which is lower than 1% of their total expenditure.
3.2.1.3 Public Order and Safety
The safety of the population, both in its objective and in that subjective component,
is an important indicator of degradation of society, as well as an essential dimension of
civil cohabitation. The public investment in this area is a major help to improve social
cohesion, also by spreading the principles of legality.
The function defined by the COFOG as public order and safety collects the expenses
connected with the services regarding the internal defence of the population from crime
and serious accidents and the spending in the judiciary system. It covers the police and
fire-protection services, law courts and prisons. The expenditure in public order and
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safety represents the 4.1% of total expenditure in EU-27. As for defence, the operating
costs compose the main part of expenditure in public order and safety. In fact, the
compensation of employees is the most significant item in the total expenditure for this
function.
TAB 3.3 Public expenditure on public order and safety as a percentage of
total expenditure in the EU-27 countries, 2011
Source: Eurostat
The European Union 27 countries spend between the 1.9% and the 7% of their total
expenditure on public order and safety. Specifically, only a minority of them invest more
than the 5% in this sector, and among these the Slovakia (6.3%) and Bulgaria (7 %)
exceed the other. On the other hand, in the last section of this special ranking there is
Denmark, whose investment in public order and safety is only slightly under 2%.
3.2.2 Economic Affairs
The category of economic affairs covers support programmes, subsidies and public infras-
tructure spending in the mining, manufacturing and construction, agricultural, forestry,
fishing and hunting, fuel and energy, transport and communication. The government
expenditure on economic affairs amounted to 10.5% of EU-27 total expenditure in 2011.
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The total spending for EU-27 in the economic affairs function is composed of subsidies
and capital transfers (which together accounted for nearly half of the total in 2010),
operating costs (30.6%), and capital investment (19.3%).
The economic affairs is by nature a very heterogeneous function, consisting of several
sub-items with great relevance for the development of a country. For instance, several
important indicators of economic development, including those related to productivity,
income and employment depend on the provision of infrastructure. However, transport
and infrastructure play a key role in terms of the impact they generate on the environ-
ment and the quality of life of the population. With regard to agriculture, the current
phase of implementation of the new Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is designed to
offset the imbalances of production. Even in this sector, a significant emphasis has been
dedicated to the new sensibility for environmental protection and food quality. In this
perspective, it may be useful to develop indicators which are suitable for the assessment
of the environmental impact due to economic activities generated by public spending.
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TAB 3.4 Public expenditure on economic affairs as a percentage of total
expenditure in the EU-27 countries, 2011
Source: Eurostat
The distribution of the expenditure in economic affairs is quite scattered among the EU27
countries. In fact, the share oscillates from the 5.3% to the 17% of total expenditure.
This evidence is consistent with the intrinsic nature of this function. In fact, it may be
influenced by extraordinary operations, such as reclassification of public companies into
the general government sector, sale of UMTS licences or, more generally, for the public
intervention in the private sector.
This is exactly the case for Ireland, where public spending in economic affairs remained
quite stable at about 4% of total expenditure between 2002 and 2007, then increased to
5% in 2008, and reached the level of 16.4% of total expenditure in 2011. This evidence
may be explained by the strong public intervention due to the economic and financial
crisis, which has been particularly intense in Ireland. With the exception of Ireland, the
highest share of government expenditure in total expenditure is observable in the case of
Romania (17%). By contrast, the expenditure for this economic function was the lowest
in the United Kingdom (5.3%).
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3.2.3 Environment Protection
For the centrality of the subject they are dealing with, the statistics regarding the envi-
ronment protection are the focus of growing attention. Above all, this is the result of the
European strategies that emphasize the need to integrate the environmental dimension
with social and economic policies, to strengthen the environmental legislation in the
member States and to require greater efforts to protect the environment.
This function includes waste management, waste water management, pollution abate-
ment, protection of biodiversity and landscape. Of the ten COFOG first-level functions,
the environment protection is the least significant one in terms of share of government
expenditure, despite the growing public concern for the environment. As a matter of
fact, in 2011, government spending in environmental protection amounted to 1.7% of
EU-27 total expenditure, which is not a different level from 2002.
TAB 3.5 Public expenditure on environmental protection as a percentage of
total expenditure in the EU-27 countries, 2011
Source: Eurostat
The country which is more attentive the environmental issue are the Netherlands, whose
expenditure in environmental protection is equal to the 3.4% of its total expenditure.
The majority of the other countries expenditure in this function is about 1.5% of total
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expenditure, result which is consistent with the EU27 average. Several Northern Europe
countries as Denmark, Sweden and Finland commit less than 1% of their total expendi-
ture in public environmental protection, together with Cyprus (0.65%). Estonia shows
a quite particular performance, since it registers a negative value in its public budget
(-0.8%). This circumstance occurs if governments disposals are greater than acquisitions
in a certain public sector or function.
3.2.4 Housing and community amenities
The housing and community amenities function includes all outlays relating to housing
development, community development, water supply and street lighting. Even though
housing represents an essential issue for several segments of the population, the public
expenditure dedicated to this function is quite restrained.
In fact, in 2011 government spending in housing and community amenities amounted
to 0.9% of EU-27 total expenditure. Moreover, since 2002 this share has not relevantly
changed, showing only a small decrease from 1% of total expenditure.
TAB 3.6 Public expenditure on housing and community amenities as a per-
centage of total expenditure in the EU-27 countries, 2011
Source: Eurostat
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Cyprus has committed the largest shares of their total expenditure under this function,
spending the 5.9%. Cyprus has spent six the average EU-27 expenditure on housing,
proportionally to their total expenditure.
Above the EU-27 average of spending in housing, there are France (3.4%), Latvia (3.4%),
Bulgaria (3.4%), Romania (3.2%) and Slovakia (2.6%). The lowest percentages are found
for Belgium (0.8%), Malta (0.7%), Denmark (0.5%) and Greece (0.4%).
3.2.5 Health
Health care, along with security, is a cornerstone of the welfare state. One of the goals
of national health systems is the promotion and improvement of health conditions of
citizens, through education, prevention, diagnosis, treatment and rehabilitation initia-
tives. Health indicators measure a reality that, in addition to being a strategic item in
the state budget, is mainly a primary element of the social assistance system. For over
a decade, in the European Union, the health system is exposed to several reforms to
promote the rationalization of resources and the expenditure restraint.
Tab. 3.7 Public expenditure on health as a percentage of total expenditure
in the EU-27 countries, 2011
Source: Eurostat
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Public health expenditure measures how many resources are destined to meet the health
needs of citizens in terms of health services, including all its costs (e.g. administrative
services, passive interest rates, taxes and insurance premiums). The total public health
expenditure in Italy in 2011 amounted to about 112 billion, equivalent to the 14.8% of
total expenditure.
According to the European System of National Accounts (ESA95) and the European
System of Social Protection Statistics, public health expenditure is the set of operations
carried out by the public administrations operating in the sector, which directly use
their own production facilities or purchasing goods and services from private institu-
tions provided to citizens under previous agreement. In order to perform international
comparisons, scholars and policy makers sometimes adopt the indicators of health ex-
penditure collected by the OECD, based on definitions and classifications set by the
different member states. This data differs from the one published by Eurostat for some
components, mainly due to the presence of public health expenditure on capital account.
The Italian public health expenditure is much lower than that of other major European
countries. Against the 14.8% of total expenditure spent in Italy in 2011, Slovakias ex-
penditure is slightly larger (15.4%), but Belgiums expenditure is smaller (14.7%). The
Czech Republic spends the 18.1% of its total expenditure in health, while the UK and
the Netherlands expenditure is larger than the 16% of their total expenditure. The
lowest relative level of spending is observed for Cyprus (7.4%).
3.2.6 Recreation, Culture and Religion
The function recreation, culture and religion collects the public spending that the govern-
ment devotes to non-scholastic and non-academic educational activities, to the benefit
of the population. These include recreational and sporting services, cultural facilities,
broadcasting and publishing services, as well as services related to religious activities.
The expenditure relating to this function accounted for 2.7% of EU-27 total expenditure
in 2011, in line with the share of 2002. For recreation, culture and religion, operating
costs represent the largest share of the expenditure, followed by an equal share of com-
pensation and intermediate consumption, which account for 30% each of total spending
in this function.
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Tab. 3.8 Public expenditure on recreation, culture and religion as a percent-
age of total expenditure in the EU-27 countries, 2011
Source: Eurostat
The majority of the countries devoted approximately 2% of their total expenditure to
the recreation, culture and religion function. Among the others, Estonia, Latvia and
Luxembourg spent nearly two times the EU-27 average (more than 4%). On the other
hand, Greece and Italy spent just over half of the EU-27 average in recreational activities
(just over the 1%).
3.2.7 Education
Education and training are national strategic areas. In fact, they are necessary for the
implementation of a full and informed exercise of the rights of citizenship and for the
improvement of human capital. For these reasons, several indicators have been adopted
for the evaluation of the education among the European Union countries. They have
been adopted in the Lisbon Strategy and later reiterated in “Europe 2020”, for the
definition of strategic objectives essential to achieve a sustainable economic growth, the
development of the labor market and greater social cohesion.
The expenditure in education and training is one of the key indicators for the assessment
of the policies implemented to stimulate growth and human capital development. The
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indicator allows quantifying, at a national and international level, how much countries
spend to improve facilities and to encourage teachers and students to participate in the
training courses. The indicator I produce is expressed as a percentage and is obtained by
dividing the total public expenditure in education and training (included the transfers
to households and public and private institutions) to the total expenditure in current
euro.
Tab. 3.9 Public expenditure on education and training as a percentage of
total expenditure in the EU-27 countries, 2011
Source: Eurostat
For Italy, the value of the indicator (8.41%) is lower than the EU-27 average (11.9%)
and several EU-15 countries, but it is higher than the German one. The other countries
which are more distant from the EU-27 average are Romania, Greece and Bulgaria, with
all values below the European average of at least three percentage point. The Member
States which allocate more resources for education and training as a percentage of total
expenditure are Estonia (17%), Cyprus (15.6%) and Lithuania (both 15.5%).
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3.2.8 Social Protection
The definition of social protection provided within the COFOG framework is quite wide
and collects several different and fundamental public services within a welfare state sys-
tem. In fact, it gathers the expenditure on services to soothe sickness and disability, the
spending in promoting services for elderly population, survivors, families and children,
as well as social welfare network, unemployment, housing in the form of benefits in kind.
In 2011, social protection accounted alone for the 37% of EU-27 total expenditure.
Tab. 3.10 Public expenditure on social protection as a percentage of total
expenditure in the EU-27 countries, 2011
Source: Eurostat
In this case, the policy decisions of the European countries are quite variegated. In fact,
the share of total expenditure dedicated to expenditure in social protection oscillates
from about 26% to slightly more than 43%. In particular, the highest spending on social
protection is found in Denmark (43.7%), Germany (43.3%) and Luxembourg (43%). On
the contrary, Latvia (31.5%), Cyprus (26%) and Slovakia (31.1%) occupy the lowest
part of this special ranking. However, several countries expenditure relative to total
expenditure is below the EU-27 average, suggesting that, in average, countries with
larger income dedicate a larger share of their total expenditure to social protection.
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3.3 The allocation of public expenditure among the EU-27
countries
In this section we describe the evolution of the distribution of the 27 European Countries
public expenditure among the different functions.
The aim of this analysis is twofold. On the one hand, it is necessary to show the het-
erogeneity of the behavior of public spending among the various countries. Through
this approach, it is possible to have an insight of the different spending priorities of the
countries and compare them with each other, in order to check if there may be country
specific idiosyncratic characteristics in public expenditure.
On the other hand, this approach allows to observe the evolution of the spending behav-
ior over the years for which data are available. In fact, as it becomes evident from the
graphics, the countries public spending behavior may vary over time due to exogenous
(e.g. economic crisis, unexpected immigration due to war) or endogenous (e.g. increase
or aging of the population) factors. For these reasons and since the objective of our
analysis is to understand the determinants of change in public spending, the knowledge
of the evolution of public expenditure over time is, at this point of the work, the main
issue to address.
The first result is presented in Fig. 3.11. In this graph, I have described the range of
the shares of total expenditure with respect to GDP, from 2002 to 2011 across the 27
European Union countries.
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Fig. 3.11 Total public expenditure over GDP: range of shares of the EU-27
countries during the period 2002-2011
Source: Elaborations from Eurostat
Between 2002 and 2011 the total public expenditure was a significant part of the GDP
of the EU-27 countries. In particular, the indicator varies between 45% and 60%, with
a peak of almost 70% in the case of Ireland in 2010. Overall, the value of the indicator
has remained quite stable. In fact, the absolute difference between the maximum and
minimum values observed in this period is larger than ten percentage points in only
four cases (Ireland, Estonia, Lithuania and Slovakia). However, the range is larger than
five percentage points (and smaller than ten) in sixteen cases, indicating that there is
a margin of variability in public decisions concerning the amount of resources to be
allocated to public spending among the European countries.
Figures 3.12 to 3.21 describe the position obtained by each country in the ranking of
public expenditure for each spending function. The vertical axis indicates the ranking
of the countries listed on the horizontal axis. The country lying in first position spends
more than all the others in proportion to their GDP. The black segment indicates the
fluctuation band of the positions in the period 2002-2011.
The “general public services” is one of the most important functions of public spending
compared to GDP for most of the European countries during the entire analyzed period.
The nature of this function makes spending in this area one of the most stable. Indeed,
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at the aggregate level, the percentage of European GDP devoted to GPS in 2011 (6.6
%) is identical to that obtained in 2002, the first year for which we have data for all the
27 countries of the Union. This result is also reflected at the individual country level.
In most cases, the percentage of spending in the GPS function has remained roughly
constant, with the exception of Bulgaria (for which the share has dropped from 7.1 %
in 2002 to 3.9 % in 2011, although not in a constant pace), Ireland (which has increased
the expenditure in this sector from 3.4 to 5.5% after a first phase of decline), Portugal
(which had a similar performance to the Irish one with an increase of 2.1 percent points)
and Slovakia (the country with the least stable performance).
Fig. 3.12 Public expenditure on “General Public Services” (as a % of GDP):
range of rankings of the EU-27 countries during the period 2002-2011
Source: Elaborations from Eurostat
This result is further confirmed by the graph in Figure 3.12. It represents the relative
position that countries have achieved in the ranking of public expenditure on GPS for
the period 2002-2011. Only nine countries vary over time their relative position of
more than 5 points. In particular, Bulgaria (19 positions), Portugal (13 positions) and
Slovakia (14 positions) are the countries which have shown the greatest variability of
their public expenditure on GPS. The annual variations of the rank confirm the former
result: during the decade 2002-2011, only six countries have experiences an increase of
more than 5 points (Bulgaria, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania and Slovakia).
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During the analysed decade, public expenditure on “defense” has been stable at a low
level, rarely exceeding 2% of the GDP. This phenomenon contributed to the stability of
the expenditure in the sector. At the aggregate level, European spending between 2002
and 2011 decreased by 0.1 percentage point. The same performance is replicated at the
country level. In fact, only in four cases, a decrease of more than 1 percentage point of
expenditure on “ defense ” has occurred: Bulgaria (-1.4 pp), Greece (-1.1 pp), Romania
(-1.3 pp) and Slovakia (-1.1 pp ).
Fig. 3.13 Public expenditure on “Defence” (as a % of GDP): range of rank-
ings of the EU-27 countries during the period 2002-2011
Source: Elaborations from Eurostat
Given the low absolute difference in the level of spending in the sector, the assessment
of the stability of the expenditure is only partially confirmed by the graph of the relative
positions of public spending in “defense”(Fig. 3.13). Indeed, during the last decade, four
countries have varied their position in the ranking of expenditure of more than five (but
less than ten) points (Finland, 8; Denmark, 7; Germany, 7; France, 6), and eleven have
changed their relative position of more than ten points (Bulgaria, 13; Czech Republic,
14; Estonia, 12; Cyprus, 13; Lithuania, 14; Luxembourg, 12; Malta, 11; Poland, 11;
Portugal, 13; Romania , 21; Slovakia, 14). The annual variations of the rank confirms
the former result: for eleven countries there has been an increase of more than 5 points
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(Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Luxembourg; Malta, Poland; Romania,
Slovakia, Finland and Portugal).
During the period between 2002 and 2011, expenditure on “public order and safety ”
has shown a performance similar to the “defense” one, at a low level of incidence with
respect to the GDP (about 2%). Expenditure in the sector was overall very stable.
In fact, the aggregate European spending between 2002 and 2011 has increased of 0.1
percentage point. At the country level the value of 2011 has never diverged from that
of 2002 by over 0.6 percentage points and in four cases the percentage has remained the
same (Italy, Lithuania, Austria and Sweden). Overall, there was not any remarkable
fluctuations in spending on “defense” for any country.
Fig. 3.14 Public expenditure on “Public Order and Safety” (as a % of GDP):
range of rankings of the EU-27 countries during the period 2002-2011
Source: Elaborations from Eurostat
This result is confirmed by the analysis shown in Fig 3.14. Indeed, although in seventeen
cases the total variation of the position in the ranking of public spending in POS is larger
than five points, only in two cases (Ireland and Lithuania) this variation is larger than
ten. In addition, analyzing the annual variation, in only four cases a variation in the rank
of more than five points has occurred (Luxembourg, Portugal, Romania and Slovakia).
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During the decade 2002-2011, the expenditure function “economic affairs” was involved
by a considerable variation of the contribution with respect to GDP. In fact, as already
mentioned, this function is by nature subject to some variations, determined by the need
of public liquidity injections or, more generally, of government intervention, in some
extraordinary moments, such as the reclassification of public companies that typically
occur during the economic crisis. Exploring the data relative to the percentage of GDP
devoted to “economic affairs” for the 27 European Countries, the expenditure did not
change from 2002 to 2011 and was equal to 4%. It had significant changes only in
the years affected by the global economic crisis (4.6% and 4.8% of GDP respectively in
2009 and 2010). However, the data disaggregated by country show the heterogeneous
country behavior, which in some cases have increased their spending as a share of GDP
by more than 2 percentage points (Belgium, Ireland, Poland and Romania); conversely,
in other cases they decreased their spending by the same value (the Czech Republic and
Slovakia). The case of Ireland is peculiar: it had a remarkable peak of this expenditure
function in 2010 (i.e. 25% of GDP), which in 2011 returned to standard, albeit higher
than those of 2002, levels.
Fig. 3.15 Public expenditure on “Economic Affairs” (as a % of GDP): range
of rankings of the EU-27 countries during the period 2002-2011
Source: Elaborations from Eurostat
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The substantial variation in spending on “economic affairs ” is also confirmed by the
analysis of the evolution of the ranking of expenditure over the analysed period. Indeed,
as seen in Fig 3.15, only in the case of four countries the distance between the minimum
value and the maximum value obtained in the ranking has a variation of more than five
points (Czech Republic, Denmark, Italy and Malta ). This result is further corroborated
by the analysis of the annual variation in the rank, which indicates that only in five cases
(the same countries as before, plus Slovakia) there was a variation of the annual rank
smaller than or equal to five.
Public expenditure on “environmental protection”, which is quite low for all the Eu-
ropean countries, in spite of the strategic importance recently conferred by the Union,
shows a moderate absolute variability. Indeed, the EU-27 total value remained fairly
constant during the decade from 2002 to 2011 (rising from 0.8% of GDP in 2002 to
0.9% of GDP in 2011). At the absolute level, a relevant variability of the performance
of different countries is not experienced, with the exception of some of the most recent
annexed countries (Romania, Lithuania and Latvia), for which a high constant relative
increase between 2002 and 2011 is found.
Fig. 3.16 Public expenditure on “Environmental Protection” (as a % of
GDP): range of rankings of the EU-27 countries during the period 2002-
2011
Source: Elaborations from Eurostat
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Due to the low level of spending as a percentage of GDP, the relative changes of the posi-
tion of countries in the ranking of European expenditure on “environmental protection”
are quite frequent and of significant intensity. In fact, in only seven cases, the distance
between the minimum and the maximum value obtained in this ranking is smaller than
or equal to five points (Ireland, Latvia, Hungary, Netherlands, Poland, Finland and Swe-
den). In addition, the maximum annual rank change for each country is larger than five
points in twelve cases (Belgum, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Cyprus,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Romania, Slovakia and United Kingdom), confirming
the high relative variability of the expenditure on this function.
Public expenditure on “housing and community amenities” shows a modest absolute
variability. Indeed, the EU-27 total expenditure as a percentage of GDP decreased from
2002 to 2011 by only 0.1% (from 1% to 0.9% of GDP in 2011), keeping a substantial
constant pace during the entire decade. At the country level, the performances show
a relative constant structure, with some relevant exception: for instance, Italy strongly
increased its expenditure in housing from 2002 to 2003 (from 0.1% to 0.7%), but from
then it has maintained the same share.
Fig. 3.17 Public expenditure on “Housing” (as a % of GDP): range of rank-
ings of the EU-27 countries during the period 2002-2011
Source: Elaborations from Eurostat
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As shown in Fig. 3.17, the distance between the maximum and the minimum values
obtained in the ranking of thee expenditure on “housing is smaller than or equal to five
for nine countries (Belgium, Greece, Spain, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Austria, Romania
and Sweden), suggesting that the relative variability in expenditure is quite high. In
particular, during the decade 2002-2011, the annual variation of the relative rank for
each country is larger than five points for nine countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
Estonia, Ireland, Cyprus, Lithuania, Netherlands, Portugal and Slovakia), suggesting
that quick changes in the ranking are relatively frequent.
The share of GDP committed to public expenditure on “health for the EU-27 countries
has increased from 2002 to 2011. Indeed the share increased from 6.4% to 7.6% in 2009
and then slightly decreased again to 7.3% in 2011. Compared to 2002, the share of health
has decreased in Bulgaria (by 0.4 percentage points), in Hungary (by the same value)
and in Romania (by 0.7 percentage points). On the other hand, substantial increases
have been reported in Ireland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (+2 , + 3 and
+1.8 percentage points, respectively).
Fig. 3.18 Public expenditure on “Health” (as a % of GDP): range of rankings
of the EU-27 countries during the period 2002-2011
Source: Elaborations from Eurostat
The substantial variation of the expenditure on “health ” is partially confirmed by the
analysis of the evolution of the ranking of expenditure from 2002 to 2011. As shown
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in Fig 3.18, in the case of ten countries the distance between the minimum value and
the maximum value obtained in the ranking shows a variation lower than or equal to
five points (Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Hungary, Austria,
Poland and Romania). However, through the analysis of the annual variation in the rank,
instantaneous variability seems relatively low, since only in seven cases (Czech Republic,
Germany, Ireland, Portugal, Slovakia, Finland and United Kingdom) the variation of
the annual rank was larger than five points.
During the period between 2002 and 2011, expenditure on “recreation, culture and reli-
gion” has shown a low level of incidence with respect to the GDP (about 1%). Overall,
expenditure in this function was very stable. In fact, the aggregate European expen-
diture has maintained the same level for the whole decade with the exception of the
sub-period 2008-2010, when it increased of 0.1 percentage point. At the country level
the value of 2011 has never diverged from that of 2002 by over 0.6 percentage points (i.e.
in the case of Slovenia) and in six cases the percentage has remained the same (Belgium,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Austria and Sweden).
Fig. 3.19 Public expenditure on “Culture” (as a % of GDP): range of rank-
ings of the EU-27 countries during the period 2002-2011
Source: Elaborations from Eurostat
The results concerning the relative variation of the expenditure on “recreation, culture
and religion” are mixed and only partially confirm the results of the absolute value
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analysis. Indeed, as shown in Fig 3.19, thirteen countries (Belgium, Germany, Cyprus,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia
and United Kingdom) show a variation between the minimum value and the maximum
value obtained in the ranking larger than five points, suggesting a relative high variabil-
ity of the expenditure ranks. However, the analysis of the annual variation in the rank
suggests that instantaneous variability is quite low: only in five cases (Lithuania, Lux-
embourg, Austria, Romania and Slovakia) the variation of the annual rank was larger
than five points.
Expenditure relating to “education accounted for 5.3 % of EU-27 GDP in 2011, com-
pared with 5.2 % in 2002. Compared with 2002, education expenditure by government
increased by 1.2 percentage points in Greece and Cyprus and by 0.8 percentage points
in the United Kingdom. In the case of the United Kingdom, it seems that more funds
have been dedicated to secondary education while tertiary education has profited as
well in Greece and pre-primary and primary education in Cyprus. On the other hand,
country spending on education decreased by 0.6 percentage point in Poland and by 0.5
percentage point in Sweden, Italy and Hungary. However, overall, the expenditure on
this function has been quite stable during the last decade.
Fig. 3.20 Public expenditure on “Education” (as a % of GDP): range of
rankings of the EU-27 countries during the period 2002-2011
Source: Elaborations from Eurostat
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As in the culture function, even in this case the results concerning the relative variation of
the expenditure indicate a quite high level of relative variability, if the variation between
the minimum value and the maximum value obtained in the ranking is analysed. Indeed,
as shown in Fig 3.20, thirteen countries (Bulgaria, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and United Kingdom)
show a variation between the shows larger than five points. However, the analysis of the
annual variation in the rank suggests that instantaneous variability is low: the change
of the annual rank was larger than five points only in five circumstances (Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta, Poland and Romania).
During the period between 2002 and 2011, expenditure on “social protection” has in
most cases shown the highest level of incidence with respect to the GDP (overall, more
than 17%). Considering the entire European Union, from 2002 to 2011, the expenditure
in this function was characterized by a total increase of 1.4 percentage point, with a
certain degree of fluctuation. The same behavior is observable at the country level
analysis. Indeed, compared to 2002, social protection as a percentage of GDP decreased
in only six countries: Sweden (-2.3 percentage points) Slovakia (-3 pp), Poland (-2.4
pp), Austria (-0.2 pp), Germany (-1.6 pp) and the Czech Republic (-0.4 pp). However,
it significantly increased in Ireland (+7.9 pp), Portugal (+5 pp), Romania (+4 pp) and
Spain (+ 3.9 pp).
Fig. 3.21 Public expenditure on “Social Protection” (as a % of GDP): range
of rankings of the EU-27 countries during the period 2002-2011
Source: Elaborations from Eurostat
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Figure 3.21 represents the relative position that countries have achieved in the ranking
of public expenditure in social protection for the period 2002-2011. In this case, eleven
countries vary their relative position over time of more than 5 points. In particular,
Ireland (12 positions), Poland (11 positions) and Slovakia (11 positions) are the countries
with the greatest variability of public expenditure in social protection relative to GDP.
Even though a certain degree of variability was found within the entire period, the annual
variations of the rank are always very low: during the decade 2002-2011, no countries
have experienced an increase of more than 5 points in their relative expenditure ranking.
To observe and graphically display the phenomenon described so far through a different
country-specific perspective, Appendix B contains the graphs of the evolution of public
expenditure (as a percentage of GDP) of individual countries of the EU-27 and the
respective annual growth rates from 2002 to 2011.
3.4 The (scatter-plot) relationship between the public ex-
penditure functions an their possible determinants
This section aims to provide a first general description of the relation between each of
the ten functions of public expenditure, according to the COFOG definition, and the
variables which are theoretically identified in the economic literature as possible deter-
minants for such expenditure (total GDP, total population, young population, elderly
population, population density, public/private sector relative prices and inequality). For
the sake of simplicity, this analysis is conducted on the aggregate of the European Union
27 Countries from 2002 to 2011. This implies that the heterogeneity of the different
countries behavior is not directly accounted, neither is addressed, at this stage.
The relation between expenditure functions and their possible determinants is graph-
ically studied through the scatterplot of the variables. In particular, since the scales
of variables are not always consistent, I decided to take their logarithms. Then, the
tendency line of the scattered data is drawn in order to understand, first whether a
relationship between each expenditure function and its possible determinant exists and,
second, the sign of this relationship.
Certainly, the relationship described by the line does not call for a causal relationship
from the determinant to the expenditure function. Indeed, there are at least two very
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well-known problems with making such an inference: reverse causation (e.g. only coun-
tries with a large GDP have a high level of inequality and not the contrary) and omitted
variables (e.g. since some other idiosyncratic variables cause both the determinants and
the expenditure functions, i.e. geography, the relationship between them is spurious or
biased).
Nevertheless, this analysis will provide a first insight on the existence (and the sign) of
the impact of these possible determinants on the COFOG expenditure functions, which
will be further discussed, confirmed or refuted, quantified through an econometric model
in the next chapter. The graphical results are in Appendix D.
First of all, let us discuss the relationship between GDP per capita and the public expen-
diture functions. The relationship between GDP per capita and the public expenditure
functions is positive, with the exception of the “housing” function. Indeed, in this latter
case the tendency line is almost completely elastic and a linear relation does not appear.
More specifically, the “health”, “education” and “culture” functions show a strong linear
positive relation with GDP per capita, suggested by the high R2 (over 0.5). Conversely,
GDP has a much more disperse relationship with the “defence function (R2 = 0.23),
while concerning the relationship with the other functions (“general public services”,
“public order and safety”, “economic activities”, “environmental protection” and “so-
cial protection”), observed linearity is moderate (0.3 <R2 <0.5).
However, the financial and economic crisis has affected this relationship, due to the re-
duction of total GDP between 2008 and 2009. Indeed, the relationship, increasing up to
2008, is stopped and resumes from a lower level of GDP, albeit with a different growth
structure. In particular, the main trajectory shifts to East after 2008.
According to the scatter-plot analysis, a positive relationship between total population
and population density with all the expenditure functions but “housing” occurs from
2002 to 2011. In particular, total population is strongly linearly related with “general
public services”, “public order and safety”, “environmental protection”, “health”, “ed-
ucation” and “social protection”. Indeed, in all these cases R2 is over 0.85, confirming
the graphical insight. “Culture”, “defence” and “economic affairs” functions are still
positively related with total population and population density but with a lower R2
(between 0.7 and 0.8), suggesting a more dispersed relationship.
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The relationship between young population with all the expenditure functions is nega-
tive, with the exception of the “housing” function, for which a completely elastic ten-
dency line is found. In particular, the linearity of the relationship is more evident in the
case of “general public services”, “public order and safety”, “environmental protection”,
“health”, “education” and “social protection”. Indeed, in these cases the R2 is over 0.85.
The relation with expenditure on “culture”, “defence” and “ economic affairs” is more
disperse, as suggested by a lower R2 (between 0.67 and 0.75).
The relationship between elderly population and the public expenditure functions is over-
all positive. The “housing function” represents again an exception, since its tendency
line is elastic. In particular, the “general public services”, “public order and safety”,
“environmental protection”, “ health”, “education” and “social protection” functions
graphically show a strong linear positive relation with the elderly population. This re-
sult is confirmed by the high R2 (between 0.89 and 0.97). Conversely, elderly population
shows a more disperse relationship with the “defence” and the “economic affairs” func-
tions (R2 = 0.69), while concerning the relationship with “culture”, a moderate linearity
is observed (R2=0.76).
Chapter 4
The theoretical model
The economic research in public choice has mainly analysed the causes of either the
total size of government expenditure or a specific public spending function, i.e. health
and education. At the same time, the issue of how the total government expenditure is
distributed among the different components is often neglected. However, the analysis of
the trade-offs concerning spending decision is one of the crucial and intrinsic powers of
the policy authorities.
This lack is quite curious especially in light of the current economic crisis which limits
the yet scarce resources of the governments. Furthermore, as the previous statistical
analysis showed in chapter 3, there are some geographical differences - that seem to be
structural - concerning spending decisions among different countries, even in relatively
homogeneous environments like the European Union. A similar issue occurs if you
consider a temporal analysis, since the same country, in different historical periods,
reveals different preferences in public spending [Tridimas, 2001].
With this section, I investigate the possible theoretical determinants of public expendi-
ture by function. In particular, following Gemmel and his colleagues [2009], the model
I propose is intended to highlight the different impact that each factor may have on the
different functions of public spending. This approach will enable to more clearly test
with econometric methods the diversity of the impact of the determinants on the specific
expenditure functions with respect to the total expenditure of the government.
In order to analyse which are the determinants of public expenditure by function, the
model adopted is the median voter one [Borcherding and Deacon, 1972; Bergstrom
46
Chapter 4. The theoretical model 47
and Goodman, 1973]. The population votes to decide the size of the public sector
according to a majority system. More specifically, the structure of public expenditure
is the outcome of an aggregation process conducted by the governments, according to
different institutional arrangements, in an attempt to find a meeting point among the
conflicting demands of the consumer-voters.
It follows that the size of public expenditure is a function of the preferences of the
median voter, his/her income and the relative prices between the public and private
sectors. For these reasons, the demand function for public spending of the consumer-
voter i is expressed as follows
Gi = aY
α
i P
β
gi, i = 1, 2, ..., N (4.1)
where Gi is the quantity of public good demanded by the consumer-voter i, Yi is the
consumer-voter i ’s income, Pgi is the public good’s price for the consumer-voter i, and
α and β are respectively income and price elasticities.
The price of the public goods is specified as
Pgi = CTiN
γ , (4.2)
where C is the unit cost of public goods, Ti is the contribution to the total amount of
taxes provided by the consumer-voter i, N is the total population and γ is the concen-
tration degree of public goods among the consumer-voters. In particular, if γ is equal to
zero, the good is “purely” public, while if it is equal to 1 the output could be considered
a private good.
Following Borcherding and Deacon [1972], I assume that the presence of nondiscrimina-
tion in taxation. This implies that the median consumer-voter pays an equal share of
taxes to finance each unit of public good produced. Hence, it follows that Ti = 1/N and
Pgi = CN
γ−1.
Given that and substituting (4.2) in (4.1), the demand becomes
Gi = aY
α
i C
βNβ(γ−1). (4.3)
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According to this definition the implicit assumption is that the private-public sector
price ratio is constant. In order to allow to modify the ratio, private-public relative
prices are included in the model such that Pr = C/Pps, where Pr is the relative price
and Pps is the price of the private sector.
Concerning the aggregation of the per capita spending in public goods, the degree of
rivalry and concentration is included in the model as follows
G = GiN
γ , (4.4)
where G is the total public expenditure in real terms. Hence, substituting 4.4 into 4.3
and aggregating, the total government expenditure equation in real terms is expressed
as
G = aY αP βr N
(β+1)(γ−1)+γ−α, (4.5)
where Y is equal to the total income of the country. However, since the data published
by the statistical institutions describes the nominal expenditure divided by the average
cost of the public good G, equation 4.5 should be expressed as follows
G = aY αP βr N
η (4.6)
where η=(β+1)(γ-1)+γ-α.
This version of the public goods’ theoretical framework provides a stylized description
of the basic variables which determine the demand of public goods. This model is now
further extended, in order to consider the demographic composition and the spatial
distribution of the consumer voters’ population.
Indeed, these two aspects seem to have a relevant impact on the determination of public
expenditure [Mueller, 1989; Gemmel et al., 1999]. In particular, the consumption of a
specific kind of public good has to be compatible with the features of the part of the
population which represents the larger share of spending within the same expenditure
function. For instance, the congestion in education should be measured considering the
youngest, who compose the part of the population consuming the largest share of public
education.
Hence, the age structure of the population is included in the model, in order to avoid pos-
sible upward biases in the estimation of the total population coefficient. This extension
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modifies equations 4.2 and 4.4 into the following expression:
Pgi = CN
γ−1Nγ11 N
γ2
2 N
γ3
3 (4.7)
and
Gi = GN
−γN−γ11 N
−γ2
2 N
−γ3
3 , (4.8)
where N1, N2 and N3 are age intervals identifying three periods: 18-25 years, 26-64 years
and over 64 years.
At the same time the spatial distribution of the population is taken into consideration
with the inclusion of the population density variable. The inclusion of this factor modifies
the former equations as follows
Pgi = CN
γ−1Nγ11 N
γ2
2 N
γ3
3
(
N
S
)−γs
(4.9)
and
Gi = GN
−γN−γ11 N
−γ2
2 N
−γ3
3
(
N
S
)γs
, (4.10)
where S is the surface and, consequently, N/S is the population density.
Using 4.10 as the first equation of the model and replicating the former steps, the new
final equation of demand becomes
G = aY
α
P βr N
ηNη11 N
η2
2 N
η3
3
(
N
S
)ηs
, (4.11)
where Y is the average income, η = (β + 1)(γ − 1) + γ, ηi = (β + 2)γi, i = 1, 2, 3, and
ηs = (β + 2)γs.
This model is descriptive of any of the ten COFOG functions of public expenditure.
This feature allows to investigate the determinants of the entire Government expenditure
structure. In particular, G can be decomposed in ten different equations expressed as
follows
Gf = aY
αfP
βf
r N
ηfNη1,f1 N
η2,f
2 N
η3,f
3
(
N
S
)ηs,f
, (4.12)
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forf = 1, 2, ..., 10, where
10∑
f=1
Gf = G.
According to this specification, this model enables to determine specific coefficients for
each of the determinants identified, which, in principle, are different for each expenditure
function.
Following the main assumption of this model, consumer-voters decide the share of total
public resources for public expenditure assigned to each function, according to their
preferences. Hence, in order to obtain the share of expenditure in public good for each
function, I take the ratio between equation 4.12 and equation 4.11. The result is the
following expression
Gf
G
=
(
af
a
)
(Y
αf−α)(P βf−βr )(Nηf−η)(N
η1,f−η1
1 )(N
η2,f−η2
2 )(N
η3,f−η3
3 )
(
N
S
)ηs,f−ηs
(4.13)
for f = 1, 2, ..., 10, where
10∑
f=1
Gf = G.
In this case, the value of the coefficient has not to be interpreted in absolute terms, since
it represents the relative elasticity of one of the ten functions with respect to the total
public expenditure. In particular, a null value does not imply that the determinant does
not affect the total government expenditure, but it means that its effect would not be
significantly different from the one it has on the rest of the public expenditure.
This result is even clearer if equation 4.13 is expressed in logarithmic terms, as follows
ln
(
Gf
G
)
= ln
(
af
a
)
+ (αf − α)ln(Y ) + (βf − β)ln(Pr) + (ηf − η)ln(N)+
+ (η1,f − η1)ln(N1) + (η2,f − η2)ln(N2) + (η3,f − η3)ln(N3)+
+ (ηs,f − ηs)ln
(
N
S
)
,
(4.14)
which is also the final version of the theoretical model.
The model of the median voter should not be expected to provide a full public sector
equilibrium. Indeed, it is essentially a model of demand aggregation. Hence, it depicts
the market demand of public goods when it is aggregated following a majority rule in
order to be exactly the demand of the median voter. For this reason, it is decisive to
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provide some caveats concerning the conditions under which the median voter plausibly
describes the aggregation process.
Mueller [1989] suggests that it would be sufficient to find alternatives which could be
rankable in a single-dimensioned continuum, such that the individual preferences for
all the alternatives are single-peaked. This condition is trivially verified only when the
cardinality of the set of the alternatives is equal to two. More generally, when the number
of alternatives decreases the plausibility of this condition gets higher [Holcombe, 1989].
Within the democratic, and especially the parliamentary, systems decisions concerning
public expenditure are delegated to the members of Parliament (or to political parties).
In this context, the citizens’ choice is limited to the vote to give to a specific party
(or candidate) among a restricted list of them. Hence, it is plausible to think that the
cardinality of the set of the alternatives concerning public choice is substantially reduced.
This result makes the assumption on this model more plausibly acceptable, even though
it is not mathematically proved (and provable). Nevertheless, among the others Mueller
[1979] cites several empirical cases which reinforce the idea that empirical work is often
consistent with the median voter model.
Chapter 5
The econometric estimation of
the model
In the previous chapter a theoretical model of the determinants of public expenditure
and its composition by functions has been presented. The main feature of this model
is the fact that it manages to take into consideration the trade-offs among the different
spending functions perceived by citizens-voters that has to be solved by the Government.
In this chapter, after having described the available dataset, I provide an estimation
of two version of this model. The first one is an OLS panel regression of the share of
expenditure on education (and the other public spending functions separately) for the
27 European countries, derived from 4.12. The second one is a system composed of ten
equations describing the share of each expenditure function over the total expenditure,
which will be estimated simultaneously, in order to take into account the trade-offs
among expenditure functions.
In both cases, I have integrated the theoretical model of chapter 4 with two sets of
control variables, concerning political and institutional features of the analysed countries
in order to account for the country-specific idiosyncratic features of the units of analysis
for this work, the 27 European countries.
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5.1 The econometric approach
The dataset used to estimate the theoretical model provided in the previous chapter is
mainly obtained from Eurostat. Specifically, data concerning the public expenditure by
function are extracted from the COFOG dataset at the division level. In particular at
this level, COFOG provides ten different categories of government expenditure (general
public services, defence, public order and safety, economic affairs, environmental protec-
tion, housing, health, culture, education and social protection). This source is chosen
because it offers consolidated data concerning expenditure at any level of the public
system for a long period of time and for each of the 27 European Union countries.
On a supplementary basis, different sources are used for the construction of the dataset.
In particular, CIRI human rights data project [Cingranelli and Richards, 2010], the
OECD’s economic outlook, the World Bank’s database of political institutions [Keefer,
2012] and Eurostat’s demographic and economic statistics are integrated in the dataset.
In particular, private/public relative prices are constructed as the weighted average of
the consumer price index, investments and consumption.
In this work, the econometric analysis is conducted within a panel data structure. The
two dimensions of the dataset are the geographical and the temporal ones. The indi-
vidual id considered in this panel is the geographical area identified in the 27 European
Union countries. The time variable is the set of 16 years within the period from 1995 to
2011.
A panel data structure provides more information concerning variables and, with it, a
greater variability. This implies a lower probability of collinearity between variables, a
higher number of degrees of freedom and, therefore, more efficient estimates. Moreover,
the panel structure allows including spatial and regional fixed effects.
The main descriptive statistics of the dataset are provided in Table E.1 (Appendix E.1).
In order to preliminary test the presence of collinear variables, the correlation matrix
of the variables used in the model is analyzed (Appendix E). The matrix in table E.2
is composed of the Pearson index expressing the ratio of the covariance of the corre-
sponding variables and the product of their standard deviations. By construction, the
value of those elements varies between -1 and +1: in the first case there is a complete
negative correlation between the variables, in the second a complete positive correlation.
However, the obtained value is zero if the covariance is zero; hence if the two variables
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considered are completely independent.
As table E.2 suggests, a strong correlation among regressors (>0.5) exists only in a
limited number of cases. In particular, it is particularly intense in the case of the three
demographic variables related to population and in the case of the variable “Empower-
ment Rights Index” with respect to the other institutional control variables.
The correlation matrix is also useful to provide a first insight on the empirical relation-
ship between the main variables of the model. From this point of view, the expenditure
on “Education” seems to be mostly correlated with three other spending functions,
“Health” (0.32) “Social protection” (0.28) and, above all, “Culture” (0.61). Indeed, this
result is not surprising, since a strong overlap in terms of public duties and services
provided to the population exists among these functions. Moreover, “Education” is pos-
itively correlated mainly with the institutional control variables, and in particular with
the “Empowerment rights index” (0.51) and the “Freedom of speech” index (0.35). This
result represents a first hint of the fact that country-specific institutions play a role in
the determination of public expenditure by function.
Since some collinearity among variables is found, I implement a principal component-
factor analysis on the regressors by thematic group, i.e. three analysis are performed.
The first is conducted on the demographic variables (Density, Total population, Young
population and Elderly population), the second one the institutional variables (Empow-
erment rights index, Freedom of assembly and association, Freedom of speech, Electoral
self-determination, Worker’s rights, Women’s economic rights, Women’s political rights
and Inequality) and the third one on the political variables (Executive Right-Left-Center,
Margin of majority and Longest tenure of a veto player).
Following Nardo and colleagues [2008], I decided to adopt the Kaiser criterion as stopping
rule to define the number of different factors which may explain the different variables.
According to this criterion, all factors with eigenvalues below 1 are not considered. The
main reason for this choice is the fact that it is not sensible to pick a factor whose
explained variance is less than the one contained in one separate individual variable.
The following tables show the results of the analysis.
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Tab. 5.1.a Principal component - Factor analysis - Demographic variables
According to these results, all the demographic variables may be synthesized by one
factor. Indeed, it accounts for the 79.23% of the total variance. In particular, this factor
has high positive coefficients (loads) with all its components, i.e. the 98.53% with Young
population, the 98.26% with Elderly population, the 98.99% with the Total population
and the 50.28% with Density.
Tab. 5.1.b Principal component - Factor analysis - Institutional variables
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Concerning the institutional variables, two different factors are associated with an eigen-
valure larger than 1. In cumulative terms, they account for the 57.45% of the total
variance. The first factor is positively correlated with all the original variables, but
it is dominated by the first five variables (Empowerment rights index - 92.65%, Free-
dom of assembly and association - 57.97%, Freedom of speech - 68.49%, Electoral self-
determination - 65.06% and Workers’ rights - 64.59%). The second factor is positively
related to three variables and negatively to the others, but it is dominated by Women’s
political rights (55.72%) and Women’s political rights (75.96%). Hence, the first factor
could be thought as a proxy of a general index for good institutions, while the second
as an index specifically focused on women’s rights.
Tab. 5.1.c Principal component - Factor analysis - Political variables
For what that concerns the political variables, the analysis identifies two different factors
which together account for the 74.15% of the total variance. The first factor is posi-
tively correlated with all the three variables, but it is dominated by Margin of majority
(72.56%) and Longest tenure of a veto player (78.81%). Both these variables refer to the
tenure of majority in the legislative body (i.e. the Parliament). On the other side, the
second factor is mostly (positively) correlated with Executive Right-Left-Center, which
represents a proxy of the tenure of the executive power of governments.
Hence, through the factor analysis the number of variables is substantially reduced - from
17 to 8 - without losing information concerning each group of variables and reducing
the collinearity among regressors. Moreover, a more compact model will be estimated,
guaranteeing more easily interpretable results. Nevertheless, there are different stopping
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rules that may be applied. In particular, the variance explained by the variables is
another possible criterion. According to this rule, it would be necessary to keep enough
factors to account for a certain percentage of the variation (usually 80 or 90 percent).
According to this criterion (90%), we should consider a larger number of factors for
each set of variables. In particular, they would be two for the demographic variables,
five for the institutional variables and two for the political variables. For the sake of
a more straightforward interpretation of the results and since any appliable criterion is
arbitrarious, I would stick to the Kaiser criterion, even though the cumulative variance
of the factors is equal to 79% for the demographic variables, 58% for the institutional
variables and 74% for the political variable.
5.2 Separate equations OLS panel regression
First of all, I estimate the simplest version of the theoretical model for each function.
Specifically, ten separate equations - one for each governmental function - will be con-
sidered and individually estimated, in order to enable capture the individual effects of
each country and the time effects. Indeed, the use of a panel allows controlling for
heterogeneity of countries.
The econometric model directly derives from equation 4.12, which is rearranged in order
to be consistent with a panel data structure,
lnGfit = lnaf + αln(Y it) + βln(Pr)it + ηln(N)it + η1,f ln(N1)it + η2,f ln(N2)it+
+ η3,f ln(N3)it + ηs,f ln(D)it + φi + φt + εit,
(5.1)
for f = 1, 2, ..., 10, where
10∑
f=1
Gf = G.
As a panel structure is analysed, i = 1, 2, 3, ..., 27 identifies the European countries and
t identifies the observation year. φi and φt respectively are the spatial country and time
(year) fixed-effects of the panel-data model.
In particular, spatial fixed-effects are included in the analysis model in order to consider
the “individuality” of each cross-sectional unit. The time fixed effects are included in
the model so that they can take into account the fact that the explanatory variables can
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vary over time within the same geographical area.
Finally, εit is an error stochastic term.
At this stage, I further extend the econometric model with some political and institu-
tional variables which control for the heterogeneity of the countries. Moreover, I collect
all the demographic variables in a set of variables δit which corresponds to the demo-
graphic factor obtained in the factor analysis. Hence, equation 5.1 is restated as follows
lnGfit = lnaf + αln(Y it) + βln(Pr)it + γlnδit + ξlnIit + ψlnPit + φi + φt + it, (5.2)
where Iit is the set of institutional control variables, Pit is the set of political control
variables for country i and year t.
The set of institutional variables Iit is extracted by the CIRI database and is composed
of seven variables for the evaluation of government respect of human rights [Cingranelli
and Richards, 2008]. In particular, I have considered the following indices: “Empow-
erment Rights Index”, “Freedom of Assembly and Association”, “Freedom of Speech”,
“Electoral Self-Determination” and “Worker’s Rights” - collected in the institutional
factor 1 variable - and “Women’s Economic Rights” and “Women’ Political Rights” -
collected in the institutional factor 2 variable - following the factor analysis’ results.
The set Iit also contains the variable “Inequality”, separately estimated from the others,
extracted from Eurostat (the Gini index).
The set of political variables Pit is composed of three variables extracted from the Polity
database [Keefer, 2012]. More specifically, from this last source I have adopted the
following variables: “Executive Right Left Center”, “Margin of Majority” and “Longest
tenure of a veto player”. The latter two are collected through the factor analysis in the
political factor 1 variable, while the first is represented by the political factor 2 variable.
The complete metadata description of these two sets of control variables is available in
Appendix E.
In order to check the presence of endogenicity among the regressors, a Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test is run. The results are shown in the following table.
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Tab. 5.2 Endogenicity test
The inclusion of income as a possible determinant of the shares of each expenditure func-
tion may introduce endogenicity. Indeed, among the others Devarajan and colleagues
[1996] and Gemmel and colleagues [1999] find the composition of public expenditure
significantly influencing the economic growth. At the initial stage I have used the per
capita physical capital stock and the share of total public expenditure in the GDP as
instrument variables of the per capita income. At a second stage, I have performed a
panel regression using the covariance matrix of the previous step. The null hypothe-
sis of exogeneity of the variables cannot be rejected both by the Durbin test and the
Wu-Hausman test. As a consequence, the absence of endogenicity is confirmed and will
avoid non-correct OLS estimates.
I am going to estimate all the coefficients of the previous equation in order to understand
which of the theoretical determinants of public expenditure is significant for every gov-
ernmental function and which the sign of the relationship is. Moreover, using the natural
logarithms of the variables, the coefficients would represent the elasticity between the
public expenditure on a specific function and, respectively, each of the theoretical deter-
minants. Hence, through this approach, deeper information relative to the intensity of
their relation is provided.
The results concerning education are presented in the following table.
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Tab. 5.3 OLS panel regression (Fixed-Effects) - Education
Two series of equations are estimated, one with fixed effects and one with random effects.
Nonetheless, in order to test whether a fixed- or random-effects model should be chosen,
I have ran a Hausman specification test [Hausman, 1978] for this public expenditure
category and for each of the ten equations by function. This test compares the fixed and
the random effects under the null hypothesis that the individual effects are uncorrelated
with their regressors. In particular, a random effect model is prefered under the null
hypothesis due to higher efficiency, while under the alternative hypothesis a fixed effect
model is chosen, since it is at least consistent.
The results of the test are shown in the following table for each governmental function.
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Tab. 5.4 Hausman specification test
The null hypothesis of non-systematic difference in coefficients is rejected for “Culture”,
“Defence”’, “Economic Affairs”, “Education”, “Environmental Protection”, “General
Public Services”, “Health”, “Public Order and Safety” and “Social Protection”. There-
fore, the previous expenditure functions will be analysed using fixed effects in a panel
estimation environment. On the other side, the null hypothesis is not rejected for
”Housing”. Hence, this expenditure categories may be analysed using random effects.
Hence, concerning ”Education” the analysis should be mostly focused on the fixed-effects
model’s results.
As described in Tab. 5.3 according to the single equations panel analysis, public ex-
penditure on education seems to be only partially influenced by institutional countries’
features. Indeed, while according to the fixed-effects model neither institutional fac-
tor 1 nor institutional factor 2 show a significant elasticity toward public expenditure
on education, “Inequality” seems to be a determinant for public expenditure on edu-
cation. Indeed, its elasticity is positive (0.156) and significant at the 10% level. This
result implies that in countries where inequality is high, the Government allocates a
higher share of its resources to education in order to reduce future inequality through
the redistribution of knowledge.
Concerning the economic determinants, per capita income is relevant in the determina-
tion of public expenditure in the sector. This result may confirm the hypothesis that
across the European countries education is mainly considered a public service. Indeed,
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in case of low per capita GDP, the Government compensates directly investing more in
public education, since the population does not have the resources to invest in private
education.
Nonetheless, private/public relative prices could certainly play a strong role along this
interpretative direction. In particular, the estimated elasticity is positive and compara-
tively large (0.812), confirming that on average education is a sector which is increasingly
subject to private competition.
With respect to the countries’ political features, the political set of control variables has
no significant correlation with the public expenditure on education. Finally, the evidence
on the population structure of the European countries suggests that the demographic
factor does not show a significant effect on the determination of the level of public
expenditure on education. In particular, its estimated coefficients is positive and very
low, but not statistically significant.
Therefore, according to this analysis ”Education” is determined by per capita income,
inequality and the private/public price ratio, with a positive elasticity, while the pop-
ulation structure and the institutional and political country-specific features - with the
exception of inequality - do not seem to influence governments in their spending decision
concerning public education.
However, following this estimation approach I have excluded from the analysis the re-
alistic assumption that an implicit trade-off in the decision concerning the amount of
financial resources dedicated to each governmental functions exists. In other terms, I
have assumed that the choice concerning public expenditure on education can be sepa-
rated from the choices of the same nature for the other nine main functions.
Hence, in the next section I will solve this puzzle building a simultaneous (ten-)equations
model, in order to take into full consideration the structural trade-off issue.
5.3 Simultaneous equations model
The governmental decisions related to any public expenditure function, e.g. to education,
are subject to an olistic evaluation realized by each Government, which should take into
account the scarcity of the public resources. In other terms, when they choose how to
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allocate their total resources, the governmental authorities implicitly decide the relative
amount of financing that each public function needs to satisfy the population’s needs.
Consequently, the estimation of the determinants of public expenditure on education
cannot be completely separated by the estimation of the determinants of the complete
set of public expenditure functions.
For these reasons, my estimation approach will follow and integrate the model presented
in equation 4.14.
This model represents a system composed of ten equations, one for every expenditure
function. For the sake of simplicity and to take into account the panel structure of the
data, equation 4.14 is here restated as follows
Gf it = ln
(
af
a
)
+ αln(Y it) + βln(Pr)it + ηln(N)it + η1,f ln(N1)it+
+ η2,f ln(N2)it + η3,f ln(N3)it + ηs,f ln(D)it,
(5.3)
where i = 1, 2, 3, ..., 27 identifies the European countries, t identifies the observation year
and
Gf =
(
Gf
G
)
,
α = (αf − α),
β = (βf − β),
η = (ηf − η),
η1,f = (η1,f − η1),
η2,f = (η2,f − η2),
η3,f = (η3,f − η3),
ηs,f = (ηs,f − ηs) and
D =
(
N
S
)
,
where Gf is the share of the f expenditure function in the total public expenditure. As
already implemented for the single equation OLS panel estimation, some political and
institutional variables are introduced in the model to control for the heterogeneity of the
countries. Moreover, in order to be consistent with the results of the factor analysis, a
demographic factor variable - δ - substitutes in this model all the original demographic
variables. Hence, equation 5.3 is integrated as follows
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Gf it = ln
(
af
a
)
+ αlnY it + βlnPrit + γlnδit + ξlnIit + ψlnPit + it, (5.4)
where Iit is the set of institutional control variables, Pit is the set of political control
variables for country i and year t. Finally, it is an error stochastic term.
Performing the Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogenicity test, I have excluded the possibility of
endogenicity among regressors. Nonetheless, the estimation of a system of equations still
makes an endogenicity problem arise. In this model, by construction all the equations are
related. Indeed, when deciding the percentages of the public resources to be destinated
to each function, citizen-voters at the same time consider their preferences regarding the
complete set of the public functions. More specifically, the equations
∑
Gf = G and∑(Gf
G
)
= 1 have to hold for every country and for every year. In other terms, the
sum of the shares of public expenditure on each function is equal to 1 by country and
year. As a consequence, contemporary errors are correlated.
For this reason, the econometric model of equation 5.4 could be estimated by the seem-
ingly unrelated regressions method. All the dependent variables, i.e. the percentage
of expenditure by function over the total public expenditure, are explicitly taken to be
endogenous to the system and are treated as correlated with the disturbances in the
system’s equations.
In particular, in the first stage, each of the ten explanatory and endogenous variable
is regressed on all the exogenous possible determinants of the model. After this first
estimation, the residuals for each equation are saved and the covariance matrix for the
residuals is obtained. In the second stage, each equation of the system is estimated
again, weighting the estimates by the covariance of the residuals from the individual
regressions. If the set of predictor variables is identical across the two outcomes, the
results from the SUR estimation will be identical to those from OLS. Otherwise, SUR
produces more efficient estimates than OLS [Greene, 2002].
Morever, in this model the constraint on the dependent variables automatically implies
a constraint on the coefficients of all the regressors and the intercept. Indeed, it must
be the case that
∑(af
a
)
= 1, that the sum of all the coefficients by function for each
year and country is equal to zero and that
∑
f = 0. The restriction on the errors is
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particularly relevant, since it implies that the covariance matrix for the errors is assumed
to be the same at every sample point.
For the sake of a higher generalization of the results, consider the system of m equations
Y = Xβ + U , where Y and U are (n x m) matrices, X is a (n x k) matrix and β is
(k x m), and suppose to write the constraint on the dependent variables as Y 1 = Xθ ,
where 1 is a unitary vector of dimension m and θ is a (k x 1) vector of known values.
Therefore, applying the constraint on the dependent variables in the m-equation model,
it follows that
Y 1 = Xβ1 + U1 = Xθ (5.5)
For this to hold, it is required that β1 = θ and that U1 = 0. The latter restriction implies
that the (m x m) contemporaneous covariance matrix for the errors is singular. Indeed,
the covariance matrix, defined as Ω = E[U ′U ], is such that Ω1 = E[U ′U1] = E[0] = 0.
As a consequence, the rank of Ω is (m - 1), rather than m.
As anticipated, given that within this system of equations the errors have a non-zero
covariance, it could be the case to use the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) es-
timator. In particular, to ensure that the restriction on the dependent variables holds,
the model should have been estimated having imposed cross-equation restrictions on
the coefficients of each regressor, including the intercept. However, this strategy is not
feasible, since it is not possible to invert the error covariance matrix, given that it is
singular by construction.
This estimation issue could be overtaken exploiting the structure of the model itself.
Indeed, since the same regressors exactly appear in all the equations, the OLS estimation
can be applied to each equation of the system, obtaining the same results that the SURE
analysis would have provided, if the covariance matrix were non-singular. In particular,
the structure of the problem is the following
Y = Xβ + U (5.6)
where Y and U are both (n x m), X is (n x k), and β is (k x m). A column of this
matrix equation provides all of the observations for a single equation. At the same time,
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a row of this matrix equation provides a single observation on all m equations. Hence,
applying OLS to each equation of the model, it follows that
B = (X ′X)−1X ′Y (5.7)
and, consequently, that
B1 = (X ′X)−1X ′Y 1 = (X ′X)−1X ′Xθ = θ. (5.8)
Hence, the OLS estimates automatically satisfy the constraints on all the parameters,
due to the constraint on the dependent variables. Moreover, the matrix of the predicted
values from all of the equations is XB, and it follows that
XB1 = Xθ = Y 1. (5.9)
Hence, the sum of the predictions from the m equations is equal to the sum of the ob-
served y data. Of course, an equivalent result could be obtained considering a reduced-
form model of the original system of equation. In general terms, considering a system of
m equations with its singular error covariance matrix, if any one of the equations is ex-
cluded from the estimation, the reduced model will have a non-singular error covariance
matrix. It is possible to obtain the estimates of the coefficients for the excluded equation
by exploiting the imposed constraint. Moreover, if the SUR estimation is applied to this
system of (m -1) equations, the parameter estimates are identical to the OLS estimates
[Giles, 1988]. Given this relevant result, I provide the OLS estimates for the complete
system of equations, which is presented in table 5.5.
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As already mentioned, in this case the elasticities of each governmental function have to
be interpreted with respect to the total government expenditure.
Within the fixed-effects model, by determinants the per capita income elasticity is a sta-
tistically significant variable for five expenditure categories, i.e. “Culture”, “Defence”,
“Environmental Protection”, “General Public Services” and “Health”. Moreover, in all
cases the coefficient is significant at the 1% level. However, all the elasticities share the
feature that they are not particularly large.
Neverthelss, the sign of the relationship is not the same for all the functions. In particu-
lar, the elasticity is negative for ”General Public Services” and is positive in all the other
cases. Concerning the positive related functions, the largest intensity is the “Health”
one (0.007), suggesting that the richest European countries have a preference towards a
more welfaristic vision of the society. “Environmental Protection” has also a higher level
of intensity of its elasticities (0.004) which confirms that the European countries have
a preference towards a more green exploitation of the natural resources. These results
confirm that the Wagner’s law is particularly appliable to these two sectors [Saunders,
1993; Sanz and Velazquez, 2002].
With regards to the negative related functions, “General Public Services” shows a rel-
atively large coefficient (-0.012), which suggests that the European countries are less
affected by debt servicing, since they show a lower risk interest premium.
As already mentioned, the per capita income is not a determinant for expenditure on
public education. Its elasticity is positive, but small and not statistically significant,
substantially confirming the results obtained by Borge and Rattso [1995], Fernandez
and Rogerson [1997], Sanz and Velazquez [2002] and Di Matteo [2005].
For what that concerns the private/public sector price ratio, within the fixed-effects
model statistically significant elasticities are found for seven functions, with the excep-
tions of “Culture” and “Environmental protection”. In four cases the elasticities are
positive (“Education”, “Health”, “Public Order and Safety” and ‘Social Protection”).
In particular, the intensity of the coefficients is larger in the case of “General Public
Services”(-0.179), while “Health”, “Economic Affairs” and “Education” are less elastic
(-0.083, -0.04 and 0.057, respectively). This result suggests the public sector is less
competitive with the private sector in the same economic areas in which the salary com-
ponent is dominant within the spending function. In other terms, Baumol’s conjecture
is further confirmed [Baumol, 1967].
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On the other hand, according to this interpretation citizen-voters may more easily find
in the private sector more efficient productions, and consequently cheaper products in
sectors with larger shares as the one relative to general services. Concerning “Housing”,
the elasticity is negative and statistically significant (-0.02), suggesting that private sec-
tor cannot easily compete with the public sector in this productive area.
The private/public sector price ratio is a determinant for expenditure on public edu-
cation with the simultaneous equations approach. Hence, through this analysis I can
confirm the Baumol’s conjecture for public spending in education. Moreover, accord-
ing to this analysis the coefficients are small, but not null, which suggests a different
results with respect to some previous analysis, i.e. Falch and Rattso [1997], Ahlin and
Johansson [2001] and Sanz and Velazquez [2002].
The demographic variables seem to have a limited impact in the determination of public
expenditure decisions, with just three and four significant coefficients (according to the
fixed-effects analysis). In particular, increases in the amount of the population may have
both a direct and an indirect effect on the amount of resources allocated to each function.
The direct effect is straightforward and can be measured by its specific coefficient, while
the indirect effect is determined by the population density, which is defined as the ratio
between the population level and the surface of each country.
However, the factor analysis has confirmed that all the demographic variables can be
collected into a single factor which is positively correlated with all of them. According
to the fixed-effects estimation, a negative and significant correlation (-0.07) is found
with the “General Public Services” variable. This result confirms that this functions
has a more purely public nature. On the other side, the net effect of total population
and density has a positive impact on “Culture” (0.02) and, above all, “Health” (0.072)
functions, suggesting that these two expenditure functions provide the most rival public
goods. Moreover, following the population density interpretation, the effect on “Health”,
which is the most positive one in terms of its intensity, could be further interpreted as
follows. If the population is particularly concentrated in a country, the health risks (e.g.
disease contagion) may increase; hence the public sector has to strongly intervene in
order to protect the population with adequate tools.
Since the population structure by age variables suffer of strong collinearity, it is difficult
to identify a specific effect of the presence of a larger share of young or elderly people in
a country. Nevertheless, both a larger presence of people over 64 and under 25 increases
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the share of “Health” and “Culture”. In particular, the first result is not surprising,
considering that this kind of services are often dedicated to both the youngest and the
eldest part of the population.
Concerning “Education”, the absence of a statistically significant coefficient may be
explained considering that none of the two effects derived from the two segments of
the population prevails. As a matter of fact, this result confirms the relative lack of
consistent evidence on the effect of the school population on expenditure on education
[Fernandez and Rogerson, 1997; Gebremanian et al., 2012].
For what that concerns the control variables, the political ones seem to have a limited
impact on the determination of the amount of resources allotted to several functions.
Indeed, the first political factor shows a positive and significant coefficient only with
respect to “Health” (0.002), while the second political factor is positively correlated to
“Housing” (0.001) and negatively to “Social Protection” (-0.004).
Since the first political factor is a proxy for the tenure of the legislative body, a wider
expenditure on “Health” is slightly more probable in case of a more stable majority in
the Parliament. However, at a more general level, the results suggest that the stability of
a political majority over years has only a very limited impact on the allocation of public
expenditure across functions, confirming, in particular, the analysis of Di Matteo [2000]
and Snyder and Yackolev [2000] concerning public expenditure on education. Analo-
gously, since the second political factor is a proxy for the political area of the executive
power and this determinant assumes the highest value for the left-wing parties and the
lowest one for the right-wing ones, as a consequence a wider expenditure on “Housing” is
more probable in case of a left-wing Government and an increase in spending in “Social
Protection” with a right-wing executive.
The set of institutional variables shows a wider effect on the majority of the expenditure
functions than the political one. Indeed, this general result suggests that the idiosin-
cratic features of each country matter and, consequently, that citizens-voters have not a
priori identical preferences across countries. Moreover, these variables account for coun-
try specific differences, which are usually taken into consideration through the spatial
(and time) effects, but keep to play a decisive role even within this estimation model.
More specifically, the first institutional factor is negatively correlated to “Environmen-
tal protection” (-0.002) and the second institutional factor is positively correlated to
“Health” (0.004) and “Housing” (0.002) and negatively correlated to “General public
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services” (-0.004). In other terms, the citizens-voters - through the the Government’s
decisions - consider the present level of this variables in order to decide the amount
of financial resources to be dedicated to these functions. However, behind the specific
intensity of each elasticity, the main result of this estimation is that institutions matter
in the determination of public expenditure, but this effect does not occur for education.
However, inequality shows positive and statistically significant elasticities with respect
to “Education” (0.018), “General public services” (0.045), and “Public order and safety”
(0.011), while it does not influence all the other functions. This result implies that in
the European countries a high level of expenditure on three strategic functions, among
which education, are the Government’s main tool to reduce inequality. In other terms,
the European Governments have a preference toward a more equitable distribution of
the economic resources across the population and education is one of the most probable
used tools.
To complete the post-estimation analysis, the Breusch-Pagan test for independent equa-
tions is performed. The test rejects the null hypothesis of independent equations, sug-
gesting that citizens-voters take into account their preference in respect of all the pos-
sible expenditure functions when they demand one. Hence, the general insight of the
theoretical model is here empirically confirmed.
To conclude, the traditional determinants of the demand for public goods - per capita
income and private/public relative prices - have still an important role. Nevertheless,
according to the previous analysis population density, total population and the age
structure are decisive determinants for several public functions. Hence, the extension of
the basic theoretical model which integrated the demographic structure of the society is
confirmed by data and econometrics. Moreover, the political and, above all, the institu-
tional factors connotate the decisions of Governments, especially for in some spending
function (i.e. general public services). This result, together whit the positive test on the
mutual interrelation among functions further prove the country-specific nature of this
kind of public decision.
Chapter 6
Conclusions
In this work, I have investigated the possible determinants of the composition of pub-
lic expenditure for the 27 European Union countries during the period 1995-2011. In
particular, the analysis has been focused on the factors which may influence the govern-
ments’ decisions with respect to the share of expenditure to allocate to public education.
Following the seminal articles by Borcheding and Deacon [1972] and Gemmel [1992], I
have implemented the median voter demand model, which is one of the most widely
used public choice tool, in order to obtain an expression of the demand function of all
the components of public expenditures.
In the first part of the work, I have conducted a review of the economic and the empirical
literature concerning the factors that may affect the education function of government
expenditure. According to this first analysis, the main feature that has to be considered
when implementing this kind of analysis is that it cannot be performed evaluating the
determinants for each expenditure component per se. In other terms, since the decisions
on public expenditure aim to satisfy all the citiziens-taxpayers needs and the govern-
mental resources are limited, a natural trade-off exists among all the functions and the
fundings allocated to each component. Nevertheless, in some papers the pure correla-
tion between some determinants and the total level of public expenditure on education
has been estimated. However, since in this work I aim to more specifically investigate
the relationship of the determinants and expenditure on education with respect to the
general government expenditure decisions, a less direct model came to be necessary. The
second insight coming from the review concerns the structure of the dataset which is
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inteded to be organized as a panel. Finally, I have extrapolated from the previous works,
all the possible variables that could be studied within this topic. While some of them
are intrinsically contained in the definition of a demand function, i.e. prices or income,
I have decided to include in my estimation some other variables concerning demography
and institutional and political issues, according to the availability of data, in order make
the model more descriptive of the real choice that policy-makers face in the allocation
of public resources among the different components of public expenditure.
I have analysed the available dataset from COFOG in order to get an overview concerning
the features of public expenditure among the European Union countries. Indeed, the
behaviour in the European Union is not equal across countries, with some of them
giving more relevance to some specific functions with respect to the others. This first
result could be seen as the first signal that, despite the relevant similarities in the
economic and social context across the European Union, there could be some country-
specific factor which may infuence the public expenditure decisions. Among them the
institutional order and the political power are the most plausible candidate for explaining
this behavioural difference within the European Union.
For this reason, following Sanz and Velazquez [2002] I have integrated the basic median
voter model, including some demographic variables such as the total population and its
age structure, beside the original structure which included only (private-public) relative
prices and income. Moreover, the population density was included in order to take into
consideration the concepts of spatial proximity in the use of public goods and services.
The theoretical model that I have obtained is essentially a system of ten equations, one
for each function, in which the dependent variables are the shares of expenditure on a
specific function over the total expenditure and by construction exactly sum to 1.
At this point of the analysis, I have implemented the econometric version of the the-
oretical model. After having checked for the endogenicity and having constructed the
correlation matrix, I have introduced in the econometric model two sets of control vari-
ables related to institutions and to political order, respectively. Since the great increase
of the number of variables may have possibly caused collinearity, I have performed a fac-
tor analysis on the set of demographic, institutional and political variables respectively,
identifying five different autonomous factors. This result also allowed me to provide a
more compact interpretation of the results.
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I have then estimated firstly the single demand function for education through a panel
analysis, where the 27 European Union countries are the individuals observed during
the period 1995-2011, and secondly a simultaneous equation model on the same dataset.
Since the regressors are the same for all the functional equations and the dependent
variables sum to 1, the estimation is conducted through an OLS performed on each
function. Moreover, this analysis was performed both with fixed and random effects.
The use of the data panel technique allowed me to capture through these effects the
idiosyncratic preferences of public expenditures by countries.
As regards the result of the estimations, the most typical variables, income and relative
prices, are confirmed to be the most influent variables in the determination of public
expenditure. Indeed, five functions over ten are significantly affected by GDP per capita.
In particular, the elasticities are larger in the case of functions which are more closely
related to the concept of welfare state, such as “General Public Service” and “Health”,
signaling that the most developed countries have a stronger preference towards equitable
distribution of resources. At the same time, relative prices significantly affect seven
functions over ten. In particular, “Education” is one of the least elastic with rispect to
relative prices, reflecting that there is a lower private competition in this sector.
Together with the traditional variables, the sets of the other determinants show an effect
on the public expenditure on several functions. In particular, the demographic variables
significantly affect public expenditure in three cases. The most influenced is “Health”,
confirming that if the present ageing pattern will be confirmed in the next years an
increasing part of public expenditure will be dedicated to this sector, in detriment to
“General Public Services”.
While the political variables seem to have a limited impact on the determination of the
amount of resources allotted to each function, the set of institutional variables shows a
wider effect on the majority of the expenditure functions. In particular, in the European
countries a high level of expenditure on three strategic functions, among which education,
are the Government’s main tool to reduce inequality. In other terms, the European
Governments have a preference toward a more equitable distribution of the economic
resources across the population and education is one of the most probable used tools.
Indeed, this general result suggests that the idiosyncratic features of each country matter
and, consequently, that citizens-voters have not a priori identical preferences across
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countries. Moreover, these variables account for country specific differences, which are
usually taken into consideration through the spatial (and time) effects, but keep to play
a decisive role even within this estimation model. This result is further strengthened,
when you consider that the value of the coefficients has not to be interpreted in absolute
terms, since it represents the relative elasticity of one of the ten functions with respect
to the total public expenditure. In other termns, a null value does not imply that the
determinant does not affect the total government expenditure, but it means that its
effect would not be significantly different from the one it has on the rest of the public
expenditure.
The importance of these country-specific effects may have a restrictive effect on the room
for manoeuvre of the governmental policies concerning the allocation of public resources
among the public functions. Indeed, according to this analysis the spending decisions
are inherently linked to some structural elements of a society that are difficult be modify
or even influenced in the short term by the policy-maker. The main policy implication
of this result is that the variables determining the composition of the government ex-
penditure are not all completely under the policy-maker’s control. Hence, if an optimal
composition of public expenditure exists (among the others, Devarajan et al. [1996]
and Bleaney et al. [1999]) the level of growth associated to that level is not uniquely
determinable.
To a similar extent, although it would be expected that in a context such as the Euro-
pean Union the composition of public expenditure tends to converge across countries,
this result is not granted. Indeed, the institutional features of the countries are still
sufficiently different to make this convergence, if it exists, slow.
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The institutional control variables metadata
The “Empowerment Rights Index” is a composite indicator constructed from the Free-
dom of Movement, Political Participation and Freedom of Religion indicators. It ranges
from 0 (when the Government does not completely respect any of these rights) to 10
(when the Government shows full respect for these rights).
The “Freedom of Assembly and Association” is a variable that indicates the extent to
which the freedoms of assembly and association are subject to actual governmental lim-
itations or restrictions. A score of 0 indicates that citizens rights to freedom of assembly
or association were severely restricted or denied completely to all citizens; a score of 1
indicates that these rights were limited for all citizens or severely restricted or denied
for select groups; and a score of 2 indicates that these rights were virtually unrestricted
and freely enjoyed by practically all citizens in a given year.
The “Freedom of Speech” variable indicates the extent to which freedoms of speech and
press are affected by government censorship. A score of 0 indicates that government
censorship of the media was complete, a score of 1 indicates that there was some govern-
ment censorship of the media and a score of 2 indicates that there was no government
censorship of the media in a given year.
The “Electoral Self-Determination” variable indicates to what extent citizens enjoy free-
dom of political choice and the legal right and ability in practice to change the laws and
officials that govern them through free and fair elections. A score of 0 indicates that the
right to self-determination through free and fair elections did not exist in law or practice
during the year in question. A score of 1 indicates that while citizens had the legal
right to self-determination, there were some limitations to the fulfillment of this right in
practice. Therefore, in states receiving a 1, political participation was only moderately
free and open. A score of 2 indicates that political participation was very free and open
during the year in question and citizens had the right to self-determination through free
and fair elections in both law and practice.
The “Worker’s Rights” variable indicates the extent to which workers enjoy nternation-
ally recognized rights at work (e.g. prohibition on the use of any form of forced or
compulsory labor, a minimum age for the employment of children and acceptable con-
ditions of work with respect to minimum wages). A score of 0 indicates that workers
rights were severely restricted, a score of 1 indicates that workers rights were somewhat
restricted and a score of 2 indicates that workers rights were fully protected during the
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year in question.
The “Women’s Economic Rights” variable includes a number of internationally rec-
ognized rights, among which equal pay for equal work , free choice of profession or
employment without the need to obtain a husbands consent and equality in hiring and
promotion practices. A score of 0 indicates that there were no economic rights for women
in law and that systematic discrimination based on sex may have been built into law.
A score of 1 indicates that women had some economic rights underlaw, but these rights
were not effectively enforced. A score of 2 indicates that women had some economic
rights under law, and the government effectively enforced these rights in practice while
still allowing a low level of discrimination against women in economic matters. Finally,
a score of 3 indicates that all or nearly all of womens economic rights were guaranteed
by law and the government fully and vigorously enforces these laws in practice.
The “Women’s political rights” variable measures womens rights including the right to
vote, to run for political office and to join political parties. A score of 0 indicates that
womens political rights were not guaranteed by law during a given year. A score of 1
indicates that womens political rights were guaranteed in law, but severely prohibited in
practice. A score of 2 indicates that womens political rights were guaranteed in law, but
were still moderately prohibited in practice. Finally, a score of 3 indicates that womens
political rights were guaranteed in both law and practice.
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The political control variables metadata
The “Executive Right-Left-Center” variable indicates the party orientation of the eco-
nomic policy, coded based on the description of the party in the sources, dividing them
in three categories: conservatives or right-wing, left-wing and centrists.
The “Margin of Majority” variable describes the fraction of seats held by the govern-
ment. It is calculated by dividing the number of government seats by total seats.
The “Longest tenure of a veto player” variable measures the tenure of the veto player
with the longest tenure. If it is less than 5, then only the chief executives years in office
are counted. Otherwise, in presidential systems, veto players are defined as the president
and the largest party in the legislature. In parliamentary systems, the veto players are
defined as the PM and the three largest government parties.
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Table E.2: The correlation matrix
